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ABSTRACT
This paper assembles a dataset comprising 1,565 banks in 20 Asian and Latin American countries
during 1989-2001 and compares the response of the volume of loans, deposits, and bank-specific
interest rates on loans and deposits, to various measures of monetary conditions, across domestic and
foreign banks. It also looks for systematic differences in the behavior of domestic and foreign banks
during periods of financial distress and tranquil times. Using differences in bank ownership as a
proxy for financial constraints on banks, the paper finds weak evidence that foreign banks have a
lower sensitivity of credit to monetary conditions relative to their domestic competitors, with the
differences driven by banks with lower asset liquidity and/or capitalization. At the same time, the
lending and deposit rates of foreign banks tend to be smoother during periods of financial distress,
albeit the differences with domestic banks do not appear to be strong. These results provide weak
support to the existence of supply-side effects in credit markets and suggest that foreign bank entry
in emerging economies may have contributed somewhat to stability in credit markets.
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Foreign bank entry into emerging market economies has become an important component of 
financial globalization since the mid-nineties. Facilitated by financial liberalization and the need 
to recapitalize banking systems in the aftermath of financial crises, the volume of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) targeting banks in emerging markets surged from about US$6 
billion between 1990-1996, to almost US$50 billion—roughly one-third of the global amount—
between 1997-2000 (BIS 2004). The increase in foreign bank presence in emerging markets has 
been uneven, entailing significant changes in the structure of bank ownership in many recipient 
countries such as Mexico, where the share of banking system assets controlled by foreign 
institutions increased from 2 percent in 1990 to 82 percent in 2004. 
The speed and depth of foreign bank entry has potentially important implications for financial 
and macroeconomic stability in recipient countries, and arguments have been made in both 
directions. On the one hand, it has been argued that foreign banks could play a stabilizing role on 
the supply of credit and deposits through upstream financing from their mother companies and 
reputation effects, particularly during periods of financial distress. On the other, foreign banks 
might be quick to pull out from emerging markets and could transmit external shocks into host 
countries. Empirical evidence on the implications of foreign bank entry for financial and 
macroeconomic stability in emerging markets, however, is limited to a paper by Dages, 
Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) analyzing the behavior of domestic and foreign banks in Mexico 
and Argentina during the Tequila crisis, and a paper by Detragiache and Gupta (2004), using 
data for Malaysia during the Asian crisis. Overall, these two papers find mild support to the first 
view. On the other hand, evidence from the 2002 crisis in Argentina seems to be more mixed,  
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with some foreign banks opting to exit in the context of a broader international asset relocation, 
and others reducing their lending activities in line with the behavior of domestic banks. 
At a more general level, the view that banks may play a non-trivial role in the transmission of 
shocks into credit markets, via supply-side effects, has received considerable attention in the 
literature of monetary policy transmission. Early work includes Bernanke and Blinder (1988), 
Kashyap, et al. (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kashyap and Stein (1995). The basic idea is 
that financial constraints on banks impair their ability to offset negative shocks to deposits with 
alternative financing sources, generating supply-side effects in credit markets, and amplifying 
economic fluctuations. While the evidence seems to be broadly consistent with this proposal, 
identifying suitable proxies for unobserved financial constraints on banks has been a key 
challenge. 
This paper builds on the idea that differences in bank ownership can serve as a proxy for 
unobserved financial constraints on banks, and combined with other observable bank 
characteristics (such as asset liquidity and capitalization) to identify changes in credit supply. To 
implement this, it uses a panel dataset of 1,565 banks in 20 Asian and Latin American countries 
during 1989-2001 and tests for systematic differences in the sensitivity of loans, deposits, and 
bank-specific lending and deposit rates, to various measures of monetary conditions, across 
domestic and foreign banks. It also looks for systematic differences in the behavior of domestic 
and foreign banks during tranquil times and periods of financial distress, exploiting various 
definitions of banking and currency crises available in the literature. The regions studied here are 
relevant to the issues at hand, as they endured several financial crisis during the 1990s. In  
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addition, Latin America concentrated 48 percent of all cross-border M&A targeting banks in 
emerging markets between 1991-2005, followed by Asia, with an additional 36 percent. 
The results indicate that domestic and foreign banks behave roughly similarly along the 
dimensions considered, providing only weak support to the existence of supply-side effects in 
credit markets. In particular, loan and deposit growth are highly sensitive to economic activity, in 
a manner that does not differ significantly across domestic and foreign banks. At the same time, 
periods of tighter monetary conditions are associated with lower loan and deposit growth, with 
foreign banks displaying a somewhat lower sensitivity. This finding is driven by banks with 
relatively less liquid assets and/or lower capitalization, suggesting that it is not entirely 
attributable to potential differences in the characteristics of the borrowers and depositors of 
foreign banks. The results also show slight differences in the cross-sectional behavior of interest 
rates. Lending and deposit rates of foreign banks tend to react less during periods of financial 
distress. Taken together, these results indicate that foreign bank participation in emerging 
economies has not lead to increased instability in credit markets, and may have even played a 
beneficial effect. 
The main contributions of the paper are as follows. First, it adds to the literature on the effects of 
foreign bank entry on financial stability, exploiting a comprehensive bank-level panel dataset 
that covers the main Latin American and emerging Asian countries during the nineties. The 
paper tracks the evolution of bank ownership by crossing the sample of banks with a complete 
list of mergers and acquisitions during the sample period. Second, it adds to the literature on the  
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lending channel outside the United States, particularly in emerging markets
1 by exploiting 
differences in bank ownership to identify supply-side effects in credit markets. As a by-product, 
the paper provides a novel dataset on reserve requirements for the countries in the sample using 
information from central bank reports. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II places the paper in the context of the 
literature. Section III discusses the methodology and the hypotheses tested, as well as potential 
endogeneity problems and sources of bias. Section IV describes the data. Section V compares the 
response of selected financial variables (including loan growth, deposit growth, and bank-level 
lending and deposit rates) to various measures of monetary conditions, across domestic and 
foreign banks. Section VI focuses more closely on the response of loan growth to monetary 
conditions across domestic and foreign banks after splitting the sample by capitalization and 
liquidity levels. Section VII explores for systematic differences in the behavior of domestic and 
foreign banks during tranquil and crises periods. Section VIII concludes. 
 
II.   RELATED LITERATURE 
Most studies comparing the behavior of domestic and foreign banks in emerging economies 
focus on the efficiency effects of foreign bank entry.
2 An incipient strand of the literature, to 
                                                 
1 Studies in this area include: Edwards and Vegh (1997), who address the role of banks in the 
transmission of nominal shocks in Mexico and Chile, Agung (1998) who examines Indonesia, a 
volume edited by the BIS (1998) that looks at the lending channel in a sample of developing 
countries, and a cross-country study by Vázquez (2001). 
2 The evidence seems to indicate that competitive pressures caused by foreign entry have led to 
improvements in banking system efficiency; for example, Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (2000), 
Claessens and Glaessner (1999), Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and H. Huizinga (2001), and 
Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg (2001).  
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which this paper belongs, looks at the effects of foreign bank entry on financial stability and the 
response of credit markets to domestic and external shocks. Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000) 
compared the behavior of bank lending across domestic and foreign banks in Mexico and 
Argentina during the Tequila crisis and concluded that foreign banks exhibited stronger and less 
volatile loans growth than domestic banks, but differences in asset quality, rather than 
ownership, appeared to be decisive in explaining the behavior of bank credit. Using data for 
Malaysia, Detragiache and Gupta (2004), found evidence that foreign banks with sufficient 
international diversification played a stabilizing role during the Asian crisis, while the behavior 
of foreign banks with operations concentrated in Asia was roughly similar to the behavior of 
domestic banks. 
This paper is also related to the literature on the lending channel of monetary transmission, 
which focuses on the potential role of banks propagating shocks via loan-supply effects. The 
basic hypothesis is that capital market imperfections may prevent (at least some) banks from 
freely substituting away a negative shock to deposits with other sources of funding. In 
consequence, financially-constrained banks may optimally choose to cut lending in response to a 
shock to deposits, thereby affecting the availability of funds to bank-dependent firms. The chief 
obstacle in testing the lending channel is disentangling whether the response of credit to 
monetary shocks originates from loan demand—as implied by interest rate channels—or from 
changes in loan supply. 
To get around the identification problem, empirical studies now generally resort to bank-level 
data, testing for cross-sectional differences in the response of bank lending to monetary shocks 
across banks with different degrees of financial constraints. Since financial constraints are not  
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directly observable, they have been usually proxied by bank characteristics such as liquidity, 
size, and capitalization (for example, Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), 
Kashyap and Stein (2000)). Financial constraints have been also proxied by bank ownership. 
Houston et al. (1997) explored the role of internal markets in banking in the U.S. and found that 
the loan growth of bank subsidiaries is sensitive to the financial position of their holding 
companies. A similar approach was implemented by Ashcraft (2000), who exploited a panel 
database of U.S. banks and used bank affiliation with multi-bank holding companies to proxy for 
financial constraints. In the international context, Peek and Rosengren (1997) looked at data on 
Japanese banks operating in the United States and found that binding risk-based capital 
requirements associated with the Japanese stock market decline of end-1980s translated into a 
decline in lending by their U.S. branches. 
This paper follows a similar approach, exploiting the presence of internal capital markets as a 
source of cross-sectional variation between domestic and foreign banks. To the extent that 
foreign banks are less financially-constrained than domestic banks, comparing the sensitivity of 
loan growth to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks may identify supply-side 
effects in credit markets. This test, however, hinges on the validity of two assumptions. First, all 
else equal (i.e., capitalization, asset liquidity, and other bank characteristics), foreign banks have 
to be less financially-constrained than domestic, either because they can resort to funding from 
their parent institutions, or because they enjoy a more stable deposit base. Second, the loan 
demand facing domestic banks cannot be systematically different than the loan demand of 
foreign banks.  
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This identification strategy is implemented with the use of bank-level fixed effects regressions, 
splitting the sample of banks between domestic and foreign with the use of a dummy variable. A 
baseline exercise compares the response of selected balance sheet components to monetary 
conditions across domestic and foreign banks, after controlling for changes in loan demand, 
proxied by GDP growth, and observable bank characteristics such as size, liquidity and 
capitalization. A second, more restrictive set of tests further explores systematic differences in 
the response of loan growth to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks, in the 
subsets of banks with lower liquidity and capitalization with respect to other banks in the same 
country. Lastly, a third test uses various definitions of currency, banking and debt crises and 
compares the behavior of domestic and foreign banks throughout crises and tranquil periods. 
A few comments are convenient to place this paper in context. While the literature on the lending 
channel focuses on the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy to the credit market, 
this paper takes a broader approach. It studies the effects of changes in monetary conditions on 
the credit market, regardless of whether changes are induced, or not, by monetary policy. This 
difference in emphasis is necessary since the paper focuses on emerging markets, where 
monetary conditions are typically affected by an open capital account. Consequently, monetary 
conditions here not only include money market rates, as usual in the lending channel literature, 
but also international interest rates and the change of the foreign exchange rate, exploiting the 
uncovered interest parity condition. The justification for the latter is straightforward, since 
currency depreciation increases the opportunity cost of holding bank deposits denominated in 
local currency, affecting their stability. Monetary conditions in this paper also include reserve 
requirements which are safely ignored in the lending channel literature as they are not longer  
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used as a monetary policy tool in the United States. In contrast, reserve requirements as still are a 
commonly used policy instrument in many emerging markets.
3 
 
III.   METHODOLOGY 
A series of tests were implemented to explore the response of selected balance sheet and income 
statement components to changes in monetary conditions, across domestic and foreign banks, 
after controlling for some observable bank characteristics. More specifically, the tests comprised 
six separate specifications sharing the general form: 




− − + + + + =
q
s
it s t c s
r
s




1 , , , , , δ ρ β α      [1] 
where i=1,...,N refers to individual banks (panels), c=1,...,C to countries, and t=1,...,Ti to the time 
dimension (the sample is unbalanced, so Ti varies across banks). The constants, αi, are the bank-
level fixed effects. 
Each specification used a different (bank-level) dependent variable, yict. A first set of regressions 
employed quantity-related dependent variables: LOAN GROWTH, DEPOSIT GROWTH, the ratio of net 
LOANS TO DEPOSITS. A second set of regressions employed price-related dependent variables: 
LENDING RATES, DEPOSIT RATES, and LENDING MINUS DEPOSIT SPREADS. Loan and deposit growth 
were computed by first differencing the logarithm of the corresponding series, measured in 
constant (1995) local currency units. Bank-specific lending and deposit rates were estimated by 
combining information from income statements and balance sheets. Specifically, lending rates 
                                                 
3 Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) provide a discussion of the use and effects of reserve 
requirements in a small open economy.  
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were obtained by dividing interest revenues over average loan volume, and deposit rates were 
obtained by dividing interest expenses over average deposit volume. The spreads between 
lending and deposit rates were computed as the difference between these two. Admittedly, these 
variables are noisy indicators of the target series, as interest revenues include interests received 
from investments, while interest expenses are affected by interests paid on liabilities other than 
deposits. These, however, seem to be the best available indicators of bank-specific interest rates. 
The vector x contains country-level variables, aimed to control for changes in loan demand. Here 
the specification includes GDP GROWTH, also measured in 1995 local currency. The vector z 
contains bank-level characteristics to control for financial constraints. Following a standard 
practice in the monetary transmission literature, three indicators were used: a measure of bank 
size, an indicator of asset liquidity, and an indicator of bank capitalization. Regarding bank size, 
the presumption is that bigger banks face lower external finance premiums and are thus better 
equipped to substitute away a negative shock to deposits with other sources of financing. To 
eliminate possible trends in bank SIZE, the estimation uses a relative measure, computed as the 
difference between the log of assets of a bank in a given year (in 1995 local currency) and the 
average computed over all banks in the same country and year: 
t c
c i t c i
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Where Nct stands for the number of banks in country c in year t. Therefore, the resulting measure 
is a normalized variable with zero mean for each country and year. The second variable, asset  
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LIQUIDITY, was computed as the proportion of liquid assets to total assets.
4 The inclusion of this 
variable follows the presumption that banks with more liquid assets are better positioned to meet 
loan demand in the face of unexpected shocks to deposits. The third variable, CAPITALIZATION, 
was defined as equity capital over total assets. The presumption is that better-capitalized banks 
tend to pay lower risk premiums on non-insured debt and, therefore, face lower financing 
restrictions. These two variables were normalized with respect to the sample averages of each 
country. For example, the transformation applied to liquidity was: 
c
ti t c i
t c i t c i N
Liquidity
Liquidity Liquidity ∑ ∑ − =
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, , , ,  
Where Nc is the number of observations in country c over the whole period. Capitalization was 
treated similarly. Potential endogeneity problems and sources of bias associated with these 
variables are discussed below. 
Going back to the specification, the vector m contains two measures of monetary conditions. 
First, the evolution of liquidity in the banking system was captured by the interest rates on short-
term lending between financial institutions, MONEY MARKET RATES. Second, the evolution of 
required reserves was tracked with RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, an indicator variable constructed on 
the basis of central bank reports (see Appendix 1 to 3 for details). This indicator was allowed to 
vary on a scale from 1 to 5, with a larger number indicating higher reserve requirements.
5 A 
                                                 
4 Liquid assets include cash and reserves, government bonds, and other marketable securities. 
5 The indicator relied on judgment, as the structure of reserve requirements can be quite 
complicated (i.e., they can be defined on marginal vs. average deposits, and differentiated by 
deposit types).  
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comparison between these two variables on a country-by-country basis suggests that they convey 
complementary information on monetary conditions (Figures 1 and 2). 
As a robustness check, an alternative set of monetary conditions were used exploiting the 
uncovered interest parity. In particular, MONEY MARKET RATES were replaced by two variables: 
the yearly percent change of the average market exchange rate, DEPRECIATION, and the three-
month U.S. Treasury bill rate, T-BILL. The inclusion of these two variables follows from the fact 
that all countries studied here are small open economies, and the stability of bank deposits may 
be influenced by developments in the foreign exchange market. 
In all the regressions, the target parameters are the coefficients of the monetary conditions (i.e., 
the δ’s). Differences across domestic and foreign banks were tested by interacting each 
explanatory variable with a dummy FOREIGN, which equals one for foreign banks and zero for 
domestic. An additional, more restrictive test was also implemented by further splitting the 
sample by bank characteristics. In particular, dummy variables were created to separate banks 
with lagged capitalization above the 75
th percentile with respect to the sample of banks operating 
in the same country. Similarly, another set of dummy variables was created to separate banks 
with lagged liquidity above the 75
th percentile with respect to the rest of banks in the same 
country. As a by-product, the coefficients associated with GDP growth (the β’s) also allow to 
explore for systematic differences in the cyclical behavior of the selected endogenous variables, 
across domestic and foreign banks. 
Separate regressions were estimated for Asia and Latin America on the notion that differences in 
macroeconomic performance and banking practices between these two regions render the 
population parameters different. It is well recognized, for example, that foreign bank entry into  
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emerging markets has led to the emergence of "regional evolvers", that is, banks that use their 
relative advantages in a region (i.e., historic and cultural links with host countries) to focus their 
international expansion, as in the case of Spanish banks in Latin America and Japanese banks in 
East Asia. 
 
A.   Expected Results 
Consider the set of regressions dealing with quantity-related endogenous variables (i.e., loans 
and deposits). The first specification provides a test for the sensitivity of LOAN GROWTH to 
changes in monetary conditions. Under the lending channel hypothesis, financially-constrained 
banks are expected to be more sensitive to monetary conditions, implying that the coefficients 
associated with domestic banks are higher in absolute value (i.e., more negative) than those for 
foreign banks. The second specification further explores for differences in the sensitivity of 
DEPOSIT GROWTH to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks. If banks have the 
capacity to adjust their deposit rates to partially offset a negative shock to deposits, the lending 
channel hypothesis would imply a lower sensitivity of deposits to monetary conditions for more 
financially-constrained banks—as they are less capable to substitute them with other sources of 
funds. The third specification is a combination of the previous two. It checks for the sensitivity 
of LOAN TO DEPOSIT ratios to changes in monetary conditions. The lending channel hypothesis 
implies that the associated coefficient has to be non-significant for more financially-constrained 
banks, and positive for less financially-constrained banks, since the later would tend to finance a 
lower proportion of loans with customer deposits in response to tighter monetary conditions.  
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Consider now the models with price-related endogenous variables (i.e., deposit rates, lending 
rates, and lending minus deposit spreads). The lending channel hypothesis implies that 
financially-constrained banks display a larger response of lending and deposit rates to monetary 
conditions. Moreover, the lending minus deposit spread is expected to increase under tighter 
monetary conditions for financially-constrained banks. This is because, in response to a negative 
shock to deposits, banks would try to resort to alternative forms of financing, increasing their 
premium on non-insured debt and, by cost minimization, their equilibrium deposit rates. This 
increase would tend to be translated more than proportionally into lending rates due to the tax-
like effect of reserve requirements on insured deposits and the cost of maintaining precautionary 
liquid assets. 
 
B.   Sources of Bias and Endogeneity Problems 
As with any reduced-form estimations, there are potential endogeneity problems and bias 
associated with the use of bank characteristics (i.e., size, liquidity, and capitalization). Regarding 
size, there is possible joint determination since a bank may actually become larger precisely 
because of large deposit (and loan) growth. Regarding capitalization, a financially-constrained 
bank may choose to be more capitalized, eroding the usefulness of this indicator as a measure of 
financial constraints. In fact, as shown below, balance sheet data indicates that capitalization 
decreases systematically with bank size, suggesting that it may be a poor indicator of financial 
constraints on banks. A similar problem arises with the use of liquidity ratios. A bank may 
optimally choose to have a more liquid asset structure to compensate for higher financial 
constraints. Again, it is unclear whether a less liquid asset structure is a clear-cut indicator of  
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higher financial constraints. To reduce these endogeneity problems, the regressions use lagged 
values of bank-level characteristics.  
A related problem, spurious correlation induced by mean-reversion may arise from the use of 
liquidity ratios as defined. To see why, suppose that bank assets are composed only of liquid 
instruments and loans. In this simplified balance sheet, a bank with higher-than-average liquid 
assets in period t-1 will tend to display a higher-than-average loan growth in year t. Thus 
interacting monetary conditions with a liquidity indicator will tend to erode the power of the test, 
biasing the results in favor of the lending channel hypothesis (i.e., banks with more liquid 
balance sheets having a lower sensitivity of loan growth to monetary disturbances). This problem 
can be avoided by choosing a different scaling variable. For example, liquid assets could be 
scaled by total deposits, which in fact seems to be the relevant measure if deposits are the main 
source of shocks to bank's liabilities. For comparative purposes, this paper computes liquidity in 
the usual way (scaling liquid assets by total assets), but an additional exercise was implemented 
using deposits as the scaling variable with similar qualitative results. 
 
IV.   DATA 
Macro data come from the International Financial Statistics. The series include MONEY MARKET 
RATES (series 60b), the yearly percent change of the average market exchange rate, 
DEPRECIATION (series rf), the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate, T-BILL (series 11160c), and  
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GDP GROWTH (series 99b), expressed in constant (1995) local currency units using consumer 
price indexes (series 64).
6 
Bank-level data (i.e., financial statements) come from the Bankscope database. Series are yearly, 
covering a sample of 1,565 banks in 20 countries during 1989-2001. The sample of countries 
includes all major Latin American and Southeast Asian countries.
7 Comparing the behavior of 
domestic and foreign banks in this sample offers a rich experiment, since it covers pre- and post-
entry years, as well as several banking and balance of payment crisis. In total, the sample has 
8,574 observations, distributed across time and countries as shown in Table 1. The decrease in 
the number of banks in Asia after 1997 reflects the consolidation process following the Asian 
crisis. 
Using the Bankscope database has two major advantages. First, the coverage is fairly 
comprehensive, with sampled banks accounting for about 90 percent of total assets in each 
country, according to the source. Second, the accounting information at the bank level is 
presented in standardized form, after making adjustments for differences in accounting and 
reporting standards across countries. On the other hand, the data has some limitations. First, there 
is a sample-selection bias in favor of large banks which weakens somewhat its usefulness, as 
small banks may tend to be more financially constrained than large banks. Second, the data do 
                                                 
6 For countries with incomplete or unavailable information on money market rates, an alternative 
indicator was used. Deposit rates (series 60L) were used for Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Panamá, 
Paraguay, and Venezuela; the call money rate (series 60) was used for India; the one-month 
average interbank offer rate for Hong Kong; and the interbank rate for Taiwan. 
7 For Latin America, the list of countries includes: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For East Asia: Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan.   
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not provide a breakdown of loan portfolios by sectors or by borrower types, precluding the use of 
controls for bank-specific changes in loan demand. Third, the data do not provide information on 
the currency composition of loans and deposits, which could be a potentially useful source of 
cross-sectional variation in the open economy context. 
While in many cases Bankscope reports both consolidated and unconsolidated financial 
statements, this paper uses unconsolidated figures to the extent possible, to reduce variations 
arising from changes in subsidiaries' ownership and to work with comparable accounting data. 
From the original source, unconsolidated figures were available in all but 73 cases. For the 
purposes of the exercises below, balance sheet figures were converted into constant 1995 local 
currency using consumer price indexes (series 64 of the IMF: International Financial Statistics). 
Series in constant 1995 US$ were also computed using the average market exchange rate for 
each country (series rf of the IMF: International Financial Statistics). 
Outliers were identified through the application of several filters, including limits on the yearly 
change in total assets, on the yearly growth rate of loans and deposits, and on the ratio of net 
loans to deposits. Few cases with other data deficiencies and with negative equity were also 
removed.
8 
                                                 
8 Specifically, the following filters were used. First, 31 observations where yearly asset growth in 
constant US$ exceeded 200 percent in absolute terms were removed. Second, 57 cases where the 
yearly loan growth exceeded 300 percent in absolute terms, and 77 cases where the yearly 
deposit growth exceeded 300 percent in absolute terms were also removed. Third, 27 cases 
where loans represented more than 100 times the value of deposits were removed. Finally, 66 
cases with negative deposits and 94 cases with negative equity capital were also removed. In 
total, 316 observations were eliminated, as some of the filters affected the same observations.  
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The identification of foreign banks in each country was achieved through several complementary 
steps aimed to minimize misclassifications. A bank was classified as “foreign” in a given year if 
it had at least 51 percent of its capital in the hands of residents of industrial OECD countries (i.e., 
excluding Mexico and Korea). The ownership structure at the end of 2001, for each bank in the 
sample, was obtained from Bankscope and from central banks. To reconstruct backwards the 
chronological evolution of ownership throughout the period, the list of banks was intersected 
with a comprehensive list of mergers and acquisitions targeting financial institutions in the 
sampled countries (a detailed description is given in Appendix 4). Due to data limitations, no 
distinction was made between subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks—an otherwise relevant 
separation, to the extent that subsidiaries’ access to capital from their parent institutions may not 
be automatic, as in the case of branches. 
Descriptive evidence on the structure of balance sheets across regions and bank sizes is presented 
in Table 2. No clear patterns arise in the balance sheets of banks operating in Latin America. On 
the other hand, banks operating in Asia display some regularities similar to those reported in 
Kayshap and Stein (1994). In particular, larger banks tend to have a higher proportion of loans to 
assets, and they rely more on non-deposit financing, and less on equity. These patterns have been 
interpreted as consistent with the presence of imperfect substitution between deposits and other 
sources of financing, especially for smaller banks. If small banks cannot completely offset 
shocks to deposits with other financing sources, they will optimally hold a buffer stock of liquid 
assets to reduce the costs of early loan liquidation. In equilibrium, they will also tend to rely less 
in non-deposit financing and more on internal capital.  
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This presumption can be further checked by splitting the sample across domestic and foreign 
banks. Foreign banks could be more aggressive in lending if they have access to internal 
financial resources from their mother institutions. Also, they could have systematic differences in 
the liability structure of their balance sheets with respect to domestic banks. Table 3 presents 
summary statistics on loan growth, deposit growth, and several indicators of the structure of 
balance sheets for domestic and foreign banks, and by regions. On average, foreign banks in 
Latin America have higher rates of deposit and loan growth than domestic banks, but the 
opposite holds true for Asia. In general, there are not strong differences in the structure of 
balance sheets structure across domestic and foreign banks, so the data does not seem to fit into 
the hypothesized pattern. 
 
V.   BASELINE RESULTS 
The results of baseline regressions for the Asian and Latin American sub-samples are presented 
in Tables 4 and 5. Given the nature of the data, which combines a cross-section and a time-series 
dimension, the equations were estimated with Generalized Least Squares (GLS) to accommodate 
possible autocorrelation within panels and heteroscedasticity across panels. The estimation 
allowed for panel-specific AR(1) processes. Cross-sectional correlations between panels were 
not considered since the number of panels is much larger than the time series dimension. 
For each sub-sample, six regressions were computed, using identical specifications except for the 
dependent variables. Those presented in the first three columns are quantity-related (LOAN 
GROWTH, DEPOSIT GROWTH, and LOAN TO DEPOSIT ratios), and those in columns four to six are 
price-related (LENDING RATES, DEPOSIT RATES, and LENDING MINUS DEPOSIT spreads). To 
facilitate reading, the explanatory variables are divided in two panels. The upper panel includes  
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GDP GROWTH and the bank-level controls, while the lower panel groups the monetary 
conditions. To compare the responses across domestic and foreign banks, all the explanatory 
variables were interacted with a dummy variable, FOREIGN, which equals one for foreign banks 
and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in square brackets. 
In the first two columns, the results show that loan and deposit growth tend to be highly 
procyclical (especially the former), with no statistically significant differences across domestic 
and foreign banks. A similar result was obtained in Dages, Goldberg and Kinney (2000) for 
Mexico and Argentina. In addition, banks with higher asset liquidity or capitalization at the end 
of the previous year tend to display stronger loan growth, with some indication that the response 
is larger among the subset of foreign banks. Going to the lower panel, loan growth decelerates in 
response to tighter monetary conditions, with some support for the view that loan growth of 
foreign banks tends to be less sensitive to changes in money market rates. Interestingly, the 
results in the third column indicate that loans and deposits move one-for-one at the one year 
frequency, independently of the economic cycle, monetary conditions, and bank characteristics, 
including ownership. 
Going to columns four to six, the upper panel shows that deposit rates tend to be countercyclical, 
with some evidence suggesting that this is less intense in the case of foreign banks in the Asian 
sub-sample. Banks with higher liquidity tend to pay lower deposit rates and also charge lower 
interest spreads, a result that appears to be mainly attributable to changes in lending rates. 
However, no significant differences arise between domestic and foreign banks. In the lower 
panel, periods of tight monetary conditions are associated with higher lending and deposit rates, 
with inconclusive results in terms of spreads (for example, spreads go up for the Latin American  
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sub-sample, and decrease for the Asian sub-sample). In the Asian sub-sample, foreign banks tend 
to display a lower sensitivity of lending and deposit rates to changes in monetary conditions. 
Overall, the results tend to provide only weak support to the lending channel hypothesis. In 
particular, loan growth of foreign banks is less sensitive to money market rates in both Asia and 
Latin America, and some evidence suggests that deposits on foreign banks are also less sensitive 
to monetary conditions (in the Latin America sub-sample). On the other hand, the results show 
no statistically significant differences in the response of loan growth to changes in reserve 
requirements across domestic and foreign banks. All these results were qualitatively robust to the 
removal of 58 banks changing ownership during the period. 
 
VI.   A CLOSER LOOK TO LOAN GROWTH 
This section focuses more closely on the response of loan growth to monetary conditions given 
its importance in the monetary transmission mechanism. The regressions parallel those presented 
before, but adding interacting terms between bank ownership and other bank characteristics. In 
particular, besides partitioning the sample across domestic and foreign banks, the sample was 
first split by capitalization, separating banks with capitalization above (and below) the 75
th 
percentile with respect other banks operating in the same country.
9 Second, the sample was split 
by asset liquidity, separating banks above (and below) the 75
th liquidity percentile with respect to 
other banks operating in the same country. Subject to the caveats discussed above, banks with 
stronger capitalization and more liquid assets could be considered to be less financially-
                                                 
9 In other words, the percentiles of capitalization were computed on a country-by-country basis, 
and the sample was partitioned between banks above (and below) the 75
th percentile.  
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constrained, and therefore better equipped to isolate loan growth from changes in monetary 
conditions. Therefore, the differences between domestic and foreign banks reported before are 
expected to be larger in the sub-samples of banks with lower liquidity and/or capitalization. 
Summary results of three sets of regressions, using LOAN GROWTH as dependent variable, are 
presented in Tables 6 and 7. To facilitate the reading, the only coefficients reported are those 
associated with the monetary conditions (i.e., MONEY MARKET RATE and RESERVE 
REQUIREMENTS). The upper panel displays the results of the regressions covering the whole 
sample (and are therefore identical to those presented before). The regression in the middle panel 
splits the sample by bank ownership and capitalization, and the regression in the lower panel 
splits the sample by bank ownership and liquidity. Each panel displays the coefficients of 
domestic banks alongside the matching coefficients for foreign banks, and the p-values for the 
null(s) of coefficient equality between square brackets. 
Going to the upper panel, the coefficients associated with the money market rate are statistically 
significant and have the expected (negative) sign for domestic banks, but are not different from 
zero in the case of foreign banks. As discussed before, the null of coefficient equality across 
domestic and foreign banks can be rejected in both the Latin American and the Asian sub-
samples. The results in the two lower panels indicate that loan growth of banks with lower 
capitalization and/or liquidity tend to be more sensitive to changes in money market rates in the 
two sub-samples. While this applies to both domestic and foreign banks, the coefficients of the 
latter are not significantly different from zero in most cases. A stricter comparison indicates that 
the null of coefficient equality across domestic and foreign banks can be rejected only when the 
sample is partitioned by liquidity, but not by capitalization, with the evidence providing some  
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support to the lending channel hypothesis. On the other hand, a look at the coefficients 
associated with reserve requirements indicates that, while they have the expected negative sign, 
their standard errors are too large and the null of coefficient equality between domestic and 
foreign banks cannot be rejected in most cases. 
As a complementary exercise, parallel regressions were computed using an alternative set of 
indicators of monetary conditions. The new set also included reserve requirements, but replaced 
money market rates with the nominal exchange rate depreciation and international interest rates 
(proxied by the federal funds rate). The results, presented in Tables 8 and 9 are roughly 
comparable to those reported above, providing some evidence in support of the lending channel 
hypothesis. In both sub-samples, loan growth decelerates with exchange rate depreciation, with 
foreign banks generally displaying a lower sensitivity. Moreover, the differences appear to be 
driven by less liquid and/or less capitalized banks. 
The coefficients associated with reserve requirements and the federal funds rate are less 
conclusive. For the Latin American sub-sample both coefficients have the expected (negative) 
sign but the standard errors are too high to be conclusive, and there are no significant differences 
across domestic or foreign banks. For the Asian sub-sample, foreign banks display a larger 
sensitivity to reserve requirements than domestic, which runs contrary to expectations, while the 
coefficients of the federal funds rate are either not significant or have the wrong sign. Similar 
results were obtained using the money market rates of Japan and Australia as alternative 
measures of international interest rates, possibly reflecting the fact that Asian countries were 
mostly non-reliant on foreign capital inflows.   
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Summing up, the results indicate that loan growth of well capitalized and/or more liquid banks is 
less sensitive to changes in monetary conditions. While in most cases the differences between 
domestic and foreign banks are not statistically significant, a few exceptions tend to support the 
lending channel hypothesis. 
The results obtained so far implicitly assume that the behavior of domestic and foreign banks is 
regular during tranquil times and during periods of financial distress. Differences in the behavior 
of domestic and foreign banks (and their depositors), however, could be magnified during 
periods of financial distress. The next section provides a closer look into this. 
 
VII.   ARE FOREIGN BANKS DIFFERENT DURING CRISIS PERIODS? 
A related comparison between domestic and foreign banks can be performed by separating 
tranquil periods and episodes of financial distress. Arguably, the latter entail larger financial 
constraints on banks, as well as changes in depositors’ behavior that may induce relocations of 
deposits toward larger or sounder banks. Therefore, potential asymmetries in financial 
constraints across domestic and foreign banks would tend to increase during crises periods, 
especially if foreign banks are perceived as safer than domestic. The sample of countries 
included in this study offers a rich information set to address this issue, since half of them 
undergo some type of financial crisis during the nineties. 
To implement this exercise, three types of (related) crises are considered: currency, banking, and 
debt crises. The definitions of each type of crises, and the series, are borrowed from previous 
studies. A first exercise exploits the currency and banking crises defined in Kamisnsky and  
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Reinhart (1999),
10 and the debt crises provided in Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001).
11 As in 
the original series, each crisis variable is a dummy that takes the value of one at the crisis year 
and zero elsewhere. 
A first pass at the evidence is provided with the help of a set of crisis windows spanning three 
years and centered around banking, currency, or debt crisis. The close relationship between these 
three types of crises—both within and between countries—tends to produce clustering, and 
therefore the size of the window exceeds the three-year period in many countries. For example, 
the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 was preceded by a banking crisis in 1992, and therefore the 
associated crisis window spans over five years (1991-1995). Similarly, the Venezuelan currency 
crisis of 1994-1995 was preceded by a banking crisis that started in 1993, and thus the crisis 
window also spans over five years (1992-1996). In other cases, such as Malaysia and Philippines 
during the 1997 Asian Crisis, the currency and banking crises occurred simultaneously, and the 
crisis window covers three years (1996-1998). 
                                                 
10 In Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the dating of currency crises is based on an index of 
currency market turbulence, computed as a weighted average of exchange rate changes and 
reserve changes. A currency crisis occurs when the index reaches (or surpasses) three standard 
deviations above the mean. In turn, (the beginning of) a banking crisis is defined by two types of 
events: (i) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or 
more financial institutions; or (ii) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-
scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that 
marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions. 
11 In Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001), a debt crisis occurs when either (or both) of the 
following conditions occur: (i) there are arrears of principal or interest on external obligations 
towards commercial creditors (banks or bondholders) of more than 5 percent of total commercial 
debt outstanding; (2) there is a rescheduling or debt restructuring agreement with commercial 
creditors as listed in the Global Development Finance (World Bank Debt Tables).  
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Figure 3 presents the behavior of loan growth across domestic and foreign banks for each 
country, both during crises and tranquil periods.
12 The graphs illustrate two results. First, not 
surprisingly, loan growth decreases sharply at the beginning of the crisis window and tend to 
recover toward the end. Second, the behavior of loan growth across domestic and foreign banks 
is remarkable similar, even during periods of financial distress . 
A more systematic test comparing the behavior of domestic and foreign banks across crises and 
tranquil periods was performed by running panel regressions with bank-level fixed effects, and 
splitting the sample of banks between domestic and foreign with the use of a dummy variable. 
The results, presented in Tables 10 and 11 are qualitatively similar for the Asian and Latin 
American sub-samples. The first two columns indicate that both loan and deposit growth 
decrease during crises periods, with mild or not significant differences between domestic and 
foreign banks, with the exception of deposit growth in Asia, which shows a larger contraction for 
the subset of foreign banks. The third column, which uses the ratio of loans to deposits as 
dependent variable, indicates that the proportion of loans financed though deposits remains 
roughly constant during crises periods. In other words, changes in loans are matched one-for-one 
by changes in deposits both during crises and tranquil periods, and this tends to apply equally to 
domestic and foreign banks. 
Interestingly, differences across domestic and foreign banks during crises periods appear to be 
related to the behavior of interest rates. The regressions presented in the fifth and sixth columns 
indicate that bank-specific deposit and lending rates increase during crises periods, with a 
                                                 
12 Loan growth was computed as the median taken over all banks operating in the same country 
in a given year.  
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smoother patterns for foreign banks. The behavior of bank spreads during crises periods, 
however, is less conclusive, and the results in all cases show no differences between domestic 
and foreign banks. 
A potential drawback of these results is that they are obtained from a crisis window that may be 
too large, as differences in the behavior of domestic and foreign banks may tend to disappear as 
the size of the crisis window increases. To take this into account, the same regressions were 
computed again using a slightly richer set of crisis variables. Specifically, three yearly dummy 
variables were created to isolate potential differences in bank behavior around crisis episodes. 
The first variable, CRISIS T-1, equals one for the year preceding the crisis and zero elsewhere, the 
second, CRISIS T, equals one in the year of the crisis and zero elsewhere, and the third, CRISIS 
T+1, equals one for the year immediately after the crisis and zero elsewhere. The behavior of 
domestic and foreign banks around, and during crisis periods, was then compared. 
The results displayed in the first two columns of Tables 12 and 13 indicate both loan growth and 
deposit growth tend to be slightly above average in the year preceding the onset of the crises, and 
sharply collapse immediately after, with mild evidence indicating a less pronounced decline of 
credit in the case of foreign banks operating in Latin America, but the opposite in Asia. Looking 
at the third column, the ratio of loans to deposits tends to decrease during and after crises 
episodes, but the differences with tranquil periods tend to be insignificant. In other words, the 
data strongly indicates that loans and deposits of both domestic and foreign banks move one-to-
one during tranquil and crises periods. 
Going to the last three columns, lending rates increase above average one year before the crises, 
and remain high thereafter (within the crises window considered). Deposit rates, on the other  
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hand, appear to react more sluggishly, since they do not increase significantly during the year 
preceding the crises. 
To check the sensitivity of the results, the regressions were computed again using two alternative 
definitions of banking crises: Frankel and Rose (1996), and Caprio and Kinglebiel (1996). 
Summary results of these regressions, provided in Tables 14 and 15, support the previous 
conclusions, in the sense that no systematic differences in loan and deposit growth arise between 
domestic and foreign banks, regardless of the operational definition of crises employed. On the 
other hand, the behavior of deposit and lending rates across domestic and foreign banks tends to 
differ during crises periods, with foreign banks displaying, in general, a somewhat lower 
sensitivity to market conditions. 
 
VIII.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The increase of foreign bank presence in emerging markets has generated debate on its potential 
effects on financial stability and the transmission of domestic and external shocks into credit 
markets. The results reported in this paper tend to fall on neutral grounds. There is some 
evidence that loan growth of foreign banks is less sensitive to changes in monetary conditions in 
host countries, a result driven by banks with lower asset liquidity and/or capitalization. Among 
the group of banks with stronger balance sheets, however, there is a strong similarity in the 
response of loans and deposits to monetary conditions across domestic and foreign banks. 
These findings offer some evidence supporting the existence of supply-side effects in credit 
markets, provided that differences in bank ownership are a good proxy for financial constraints 
on banks, and that no systematic differences arise in loan demand across domestic and foreign  
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banks. While the latter may be unlikely, the fact that the differences are driven by less liquid 
and/or less capitalized banks offers an additional support. 
At a more general level, the results indicate that foreign bank participation in emerging markets 
has not led to increased instability in credit markets. The response of credit to economic activity 
and monetary conditions seems to be roughly similar across domestic and foreign banks. 
Differences, if any, appear to be more closely related to the behavior of interest rates. In 
particular, deposit and lending rates of foreign banks tend to be less sensitive to changes in 
monetary conditions, and smoother during periods of financial turmoil in host countries, which 
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Source: Central Bank reports and International Financial Statistics. 
For countries with incomplete or not available information on money market rates, an alternative 
indicator was used. The call money rate (series 60) was used for India, the 1-month average 
interbank offer rate for Hong Kong, and the interbank rate for Taiwan.  
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Figure 2. Money Market Rates and Reserve Requirements, Latin America, 1990-2000 
 
 





























































































Source: Central Bank reports and International Financial Statistics. 
For countries with incomplete or not available information on money market rates, an alternative 
indicator was used. Deposit rates (series 60L) were used for Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Panamá, 
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Table 1. Sample Coverage by Regions and Bank Ownership 
Asia Latin America Total Observations
Domestic Foreign Total Domestic Foreign Total Freq. Percent Cum.
1989 . . 0 2 1 3 3 0.03 0.03
1990 9 2 11 9 3 12 23 0.27 0.30
1991 28 5 33 20 3 23 56 0.65 0.96
1992 84 31 115 42 13 55 170 1.98 2.94
1993 280 101 381 159 96 255 636 7.42 10.36
1994 366 132 498 294 157 451 949 11.07 21.43
1995 424 164 588 321 195 516 1104 12.88 34.30
1996 452 182 634 346 212 558 1192 13.90 48.20
1997 411 189 600 329 220 549 1149 13.40 61.60
1998 399 190 589 336 241 577 1166 13.60 75.20
1999 365 172 537 335 235 570 1107 12.91 88.12
2000 281 142 423 319 250 569 992 11.57 99.69
2001 5 1 6 14 7 21 27 0.31 100.00
Total 3104 1311 4415 2526 1633 4159 8574 100
This Table shows the temporal distribution of the bank-level data. The sample comes from the BankScope database, and covers 
20 emerging economies in Asia and Latin America.  
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Table 2. Balance Sheet Structure by Regions and Quintiles of Bank Size 
Asian Latin America
Quintiles of bank size 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100 0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100
Total loans 50.8 51.5 52.2 57.8 60.4 51.5 54.7 53.2 47.9 50.0
Problem loans 3.0 3.8 2.0 2.7 3.8 3.1 2.4 2.1 2.4 4.7
Loan loss reserves 4.9 2.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 4.5 3.1 2.6 2.2 3.0
Net Loans 45.9 49.1 50.7 56.4 59.2 48.1 52.9 51.7 47.1 49.8
Deposits with banks 16.6 13.2 11.9 9.2 11.4 10.4 9.0 8.6 7.0 4.8
Securities 14.8 12.4 14.5 13.8 10.4 15.9 15.2 18.0 21.6 18.7
Equity investment 5.0 7.4 6.1 2.6 1.9 2.8 2.4 1.8 2.5 3.4
Total other earning assets 44.2 43.0 41.5 34.8 30.7 33.1 31.4 33.6 36.9 34.6
Total non-earning assets 7.2 6.2 5.8 6.6 7.9 13.9 12.2 11.5 13.3 12.9
Fixed assets 2.7 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.2 4.9 3.5 3.2 2.7 2.6
Total assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total deposits 53.8 59.1 61.2 72.6 76.8 58.9 66.7 65.8 59.3 56.1
Money Market Funding 9.6 8.2 8.4 4.7 3.6 8.0 9.3 12.0 14.8 16.4
Other Funding 3.5 4.9 8.5 4.7 6.1 2.0 2.8 4.0 6.5 9.7
Other liabilities 5.5 5.4 5.3 6.5 6.8 6.0 5.9 6.5 8.6 9.0
Total liabilities 72.4 77.6 83.4 88.6 93.2 75.0 84.8 88.2 89.2 91.2
Equity 27.6 22.5 16.6 11.4 6.7 25.0 15.2 11.8 10.8 8.8
Total liabilities and equity 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No. Observations 578 761 888 972 1204 1131 948 821 737 504
Median Assets (million 1995 US$)  58 210 489 1,591 6,351 50 199 486 1,443 6,392
Mean Assets (million 1995 US$) 58 212 517 1,685 12,615 54 203 512 1,561 11,498
Other earning assets include due from Central Banks, deposits with banks, bonds, securities, and equity investments. Total deposits include demand
deposits, saving deposits, certificates of deposits, and banks deposits. Equity includes equity reserves and share capital.  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics by Regions and Bank Ownership 
Domestic Banks Foreign Banks
Mean Median Max. Min. Mean Median Max. Min.
A) Asia
Loan Growth 11.2 10.5 240.4 -128.6 5.1 8.3 218.2 -206.9
Deposit Growth 11.0 9.3 215.7 -183.8 8.3 8.4 216.2 -108.1
Net Loans/Total Deposits 81.8 75.9 484.0 21.1 88.8 80.7 465.0 22.0
Net Loans/Total Assets 56.1 57.4 87.1 11.8 54.5 58.0 87.0 10.0
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 31.4 28.5 78.4 5.2 32.7 30.0 75.9 6.1
Non Earning Assets/Total Assets 9.9 8.0 74.4 5.0 11.2 8.3 71.2 5.0
Total Deposits/Total Assets 75.2 79.5 94.9 5.2 68.9 74.8 94.9 7.2
Money Market Funding/Total Assets 4.1 0.9 77.2 0.0 4.4 0.0 73.3 0.0
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 90.1 92.3 99.7 40.9 86.1 89.9 99.8 40.3
Net Worth/Total Assets 9.9 7.7 59.1 0.3 13.9 10.1 59.7 0.2
Efective Bank Spread 3.8 3.8 19.0 -14.9 5.1 3.7 135.3 -4.4
B) Latin America
Loan Growth 3.4 5.0 202.4 -237.0 8.0 7.0 247.9 -209.2
Deposit Growth 3.6 5.3 229.8 -236.6 5.4 5.8 196.2 -181.8
Net Loans/Total Deposits 89.0 80.4 494.1 20.1 89.1 81.2 478.3 20.6
Net Loans/Total Assets 52.5 54.6 86.3 10.2 50.4 53.0 87.8 10.1
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 28.4 25.7 79.5 5.0 31.1 26.8 78.8 5.0
Non Earning Assets/Total Assets 14.7 12.4 75.0 5.0 16.0 13.1 77.4 5.0
Total Deposits/Total Assets 65.2 69.7 93.7 5.4 62.7 69.8 94.9 5.5
Money Market Funding/Total Assets 9.0 2.2 64.3 0.0 12.5 3.3 74.1 0.0
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 85.1 87.8 99.9 40.0 86.5 89.4 99.9 40.2
Net Worth/Total Assets 14.9 12.2 60.0 0.1 13.5 10.6 59.8 0.1
Efective Bank Spread 8.9 7.0 82.2 -19.6 7.8 6.0 101.4 -31.0
B) Whole Sample
Loan Growth 6.9 8.0 240.4 -237.0 7.2 7.5 247.9 -209.2
Deposit Growth 6.9 7.7 229.8 -236.6 6.1 6.3 216.2 -181.8
Net Loans/Total Deposits 85.8 78.7 494.1 20.1 89.0 81.1 478.3 20.6
Net Loans/Total Assets 54.1 55.6 87.1 10.2 51.5 54.4 87.8 10.0
Other Earning Assets/Total Assets 29.7 26.7 79.5 5.0 31.5 27.7 78.8 5.0
Non Earning Assets/Total Assets 12.6 9.7 75.0 5.0 14.8 11.5 77.4 5.0
Total Deposits/Total Assets 69.6 74.6 94.9 5.2 64.3 71.0 94.9 5.5
Money Market Funding/Total Assets 6.7 1.1 77.2 0.0 10.3 1.2 74.1 0.0
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 87.3 89.6 99.9 40.0 86.4 89.5 99.9 40.2
Net Worth/Total Assets 12.7 10.4 60.0 0.1 13.6 10.5 59.8 0.1
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Table 4. GLS Estimates of Selected Variables on Monetary Conditions Latin-American sub-
sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Loan Growth Deposit Growth Loans/Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Controls
GDP Growth 2.016 1.695 0.938 0.011 -0.129 -0.107
[0.369]*** [0.391]*** [1.838] [0.047] [0.065]** [0.075]
Foreign*GDP Growth -0.329 -0.063 -2.619 -0.039 -0.111 -0.108
[0.582] [0.614] [2.906] [0.072] [0.100] [0.115]
Size 0.316 0.377 -0.242 -0.005 0.002 -0.008
[0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.185] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007]
Foreign*Size 0.008 0.011 0.068 0.000 -0.007 -0.006
[0.040] [0.040] [0.239] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.837 -0.043 -1.052 -0.036 -0.048 -0.068
[0.127]*** [0.129] [0.686] [0.016]** [0.022]** [0.025]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.046 -0.210 1.796 0.005 -0.002 -0.010
[0.188] [0.190] [1.022]* [0.025] [0.032] [0.039]
Capitalization (t-1) 1.109 2.178 -1.351 -0.065 0.050 0.026
[0.212]*** [0.215]*** [1.058] [0.025]** [0.035] [0.040]
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.704 1.337 0.386 0.039 -0.017 -0.015
[0.376]* [0.378]*** [1.950] [0.047] [0.063] [0.075]
Monetary Conditions
Reserve Requirements -0.088 -0.028 0.048 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004
[0.043]** [0.047] [0.204] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008]
Foreign*Reserve Requirements 0.007 -0.046 0.227 -0.017 0.029 0.014
[0.082] [0.088] [0.394] [0.010]* [0.014]** [0.015]
Money Market Rate -0.042 -0.055 0.000 0.106 0.233 0.388
[0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.029] [0.028]*** [0.039]*** [0.045]***
Foreign*Money Market Rate 0.056 0.399 -0.013 0.070 0.026 0.107
[0.034]* [0.102]*** [0.065] [0.039]* [0.050] [0.061]*
Observations 2317 2350 2324 2194 2235 2197
Groups 591 599 593 582 595 584
R. Sq. 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.13
Rho AR(1) 0.18 0.06 0.55 0.42 0.09 0.31
This Table presents the results of GLS panel regressions with bank-level fixed effects, and allowing for panel-specific AR(1) errors. The sample comes from the 
Bankscope database and covers banks operating in selected Latin American countries from 1989-2001. Robust standard errors are reported between square 
brackets. Statistical significance at one, five, and ten percent level, are indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. Six models are considered, each one presented in a 
separate column. Each model uses a different dependent variable, specified in the first row of the Table. All models share the same set of explanatory variables, 
including country-level controls (GDP growth), bank-level controls (bank size, bank liquidity, and bank capitalization), and two indicators of monetary conditions 
(an index that tracks the evolution of reserve requirements, and the money market rate). The sample is split across domestic and foreign banks with the use of a 
dummy ("Foreign") which equals one for foreign banks and zero otherwise.  
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Table 5. GLS Estimates of Selected Variables on Monetary Conditions Asian sub-sample 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Loan Growth Deposit Growth Loans/Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Controls
GDP Growth 1.906 1.364 -0.101 0.073 -0.099 -0.027
[0.238]*** [0.268]*** [1.260] [0.026]*** [0.018]*** [0.031]
Foreign*GDP Growth 0.389 1.202 -0.944 0.004 0.071 0.063
[0.351] [0.393]*** [1.887] [0.040] [0.028]** [0.048]
Size 0.281 0.315 0.126 0.001 -0.002 0.000
[0.032]*** [0.035]*** [0.193] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005]
Foreign*Size 0.127 0.209 0.303 0.009 -0.001 0.005
[0.044]*** [0.047]*** [0.264] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.856 -0.224 -1.537 -0.025 -0.036 -0.066
[0.107]*** [0.119]* [0.646]** [0.013]* [0.008]*** [0.015]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.309 0.595 0.602 -0.010 0.011 0.016
[0.171]* [0.189]*** [1.005] [0.021] [0.013] [0.025]
Capitalization (t-1) 0.870 0.924 0.365 0.047 -0.013 0.033
[0.138]*** [0.156]*** [0.806] [0.015]*** [0.010] [0.018]*
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.045 0.544 -0.221 -0.032 0.046 -0.002
[0.216] [0.238]** [1.257] [0.024] [0.015]*** [0.029]
Monetary Conditions
Reserve Requirements -0.033 0.111 -0.091 0.001 0.023 0.011
[0.089] [0.099] [0.473] [0.009] [0.006]*** [0.011]
Foreign*Reserve Requirements -0.352 -0.329 -0.064 -0.011 -0.026 -0.025
[0.196]* [0.219] [1.039] [0.021] [0.014]* [0.025]
Money Market Rate -0.793 -0.005 -1.245 -0.063 0.254 0.200
[0.177]*** [0.195] [0.998] [0.019]*** [0.013]*** [0.023]***
Foreign*Money Market Rate 0.569 -0.169 0.052 0.094 -0.158 -0.052
[0.260]** [0.288] [1.435] [0.029]*** [0.019]*** [0.034]
Observations 2631 2623 2582 2308 2380 2314
Groups 627 628 613 571 593 573
R. Sq. 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.40 0.15
Rho AR(1) 0.15 0.02 0.45 0.40 -0.01 0.42
This Table presents the results of GLS panel regressions with bank-level fixed effects, and allowing for panel-specific AR(1) errors. The sample comes from the 
Bankscope database and covers banks operating in selected Latin American countries from 1989-2001. Robust standard errors are reported between square 
brackets. Statistical significance at one, five, and ten percent level, are indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. Six models are considered, each one presented in a 
separate column. Each model uses a different dependent variable, specified in the first row of the Table. All models share the same set of explanatory variables, 
including country-level controls (GDP growth), bank-level controls (bank size, bank liquidity, and bank capitalization), and two indicators of monetary conditions 
(an index that tracks the evolution of reserve requirements, and the money market rate). The sample is split across domestic and foreign banks with the use of a 
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Money Market Rate -0.042 *** 0.013 [0.10] Obs. 2317
(0.0064) (0.0332) Groups 591
Reserve Requirements -0.088 ** -0.081 [0.93] R-Squared 0.167
(0.0431) (0.0697) Rho AR(1) 0.175
Capitalization Below 75 percentile
Money Market Rate -0.042 *** -0.019 [0.46] Obs. 1759
(0.0060) (0.0304) Groups 483
Reserve Requirements -0.094 * -0.057 [0.68] R-Squared 0.179
(0.0482) (0.0748) Rho AR(1) 0.207
Capitalization Above 75 percentile
Money Market Rate 0.028 1.232 [0.29] Obs. 401
(0.0336) (1.1285) Groups 165
Reserve Requirements 0.014 0.188 [0.38] R-Squared 0.269
(0.0895) (0.1743) Rho AR(1) 0.359
Liquidity Below 75 percentile
Money Market Rate -0.042 *** -0.003 [0.04] Obs. 1718
(0.0053) (0.0184) Groups 501
Reserve Requirements -0.028 -0.040 [0.88] R-Squared 0.272
(0.0392) (0.0663) Rho AR(1) 0.259
Liquidity Above 75 percentile
Money Market Rate 0.984 0.778 [0.91] Obs. 377
(1.2471) (1.2656) Groups 171
Reserve Requirements -0.603 ** -0.206 [0.34] R-Squared 0.102
(0.3016) (0.2861) Rho AR(1) 0.195
This table presents selected coefficients from six sets of fixed-effects panel regressions. In all cases, the dependent variable is 
loan growth in constant local currency units. The reported coefficients are those associated with monetary conditions, measured 
by money market rates and an indicator of reserve requirements (which goes from 1 to 5 where a higher number indicates higher 
reserves). Controls, not reported here, include GDP growth and a set of bank characteristics (size, asset liquidity and 
capitalization). The table is divided in three panels. The upper displays the results of the regression based on the whole sample. 
The middle panel reports the results of two regressions, splitting the sample between banks with capitalization above (and below) 
the 75 percentile relative to other banks operating in the same country. The lower panel follows a similar structure, but the 
sample is split by liquidity levels. The estimation is based on GLS, allowing for panel-specific AR(1) processes.
Standard errors between parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 10%; *** significant at 1%. The p-values 
coresponding to the null of coefficient equality across domestic and foreign banks between [square] brackets.
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Money Market Rate -0.793 *** -0.224 [0.03] Obs. 2631
(0.1770) (0.2034) Groups 627
Reserve Requirements -0.033 -0.384 ** [0.07] R-Squared 0.2614
(0.0893) (0.1760) Rho AR(1) 0.151788
Capitalization Below 75 percentile
Money Market Rate -0.647 *** -0.382 [0.42] Obs. 2032
(0.2000) (0.2724) Groups 511
Reserve Requirements -0.022 -0.254 [0.22] R-Squared 0.2515
(0.0882) (0.1670) Rho AR(1) 0.162126
Capitalization Above 75 percentile
Money Market Rate -0.825 -0.059 [0.29] Obs. 442
(0.5376) (0.5424) Groups 181
Reserve Requirements 0.031 -0.541 [0.58] R-Squared 0.3708
(0.3771) (0.9635) Rho AR(1) 0.206858
Liquidity Below 75 percentile
Money Market Rate -1.030 *** -0.518 *** [0.02] Obs. 2105
(0.1560) (0.1778) Groups 527
Reserve Requirements -0.040 -0.447 *** [0.01] R-Squared 0.343
(0.0730) (0.1435) Rho AR(1) 0.295
Liquidity Above 75 percentile
Money Market Rate -0.623 0.767 [0.45] Obs. 358
(1.4300) (1.1636) Groups 161
Reserve Requirements -0.225 -1.232 [0.47] R-Squared 0.274
(0.5974) (1.2425) Rho AR(1) 0.242
This table presents selected coefficients from six sets of fixed-effects panel regressions. In all cases, the dependent variable is 
loan growth in constant local currency units. The reported coefficients are those associated with monetary conditions, measured 
by money market rates and an indicator of reserve requirements (which goes from 1 to 5 where a higher number indicates higher 
reserves). Controls, not reported here, include GDP growth and a set of bank characteristics (size, asset liquidity and 
capitalization). The table is divided in three panels. The upper displays the results of the regression based on the whole sample. 
The middle panel reports the results of two regressions, splitting the sample between banks with capitalization above (and below) 
the 75 percentile relative to other banks operating in the same country. The lower panel follows a similar structure, but the 
sample is split by liquidity levels. The estimation is based on GLS, allowing for panel-specific AR(1) processes.
Standard errors between parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 10%; *** significant at 1%. The p-values 
coresponding to the null of coefficient equality across domestic and foreign banks between [square] brackets.
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Exchange Rate Depreciation -0.4138 *** 0.0482 [0.00] Obs. 2299
(0.0751) (0.1345) Groups 589
Reserve Requirements -0.080 * -0.081 [0.98] R-Squared 0.16
(0.0438) (0.0707) Rho AR(1) 0.19
US Federal Funds Rate -0.035 -0.049 * [0.45]
(0.0248) (0.0263)
Capitalization Below 75 percentile
Exchange Rate Depreciation -0.4398 *** 0.0914 [0.00] Obs. 1744
(0.0750) (0.1314) Groups 483
Reserve Requirements -0.094 * -0.056 [0.68] R-Squared 0.17
(0.0488) (0.0762) Rho AR(1) 0.22
US Federal Funds Rate -0.048 * -0.057 ** [0.68]
(0.0263) (0.0272)
Capitalization Above 75 percentile
Exchange Rate Depreciation -0.0729 0.0362 [0.78] Obs. 398
(0.2306) (0.1450) Groups 162
Reserve Requirements 0.022 -0.039 [0.32] R-Squared 0.27
(0.0922) (0.0676) Rho AR(1) 0.39
US Federal Funds Rate -0.011 -0.004 [0.28]
(0.0663) (0.0250)
Liquidity Below 75 percentile
Exchange Rate Depreciation -0.4186 *** 0.0966 [0.00] Obs. 1707
(0.0727) (0.5544) Groups 497
Reserve Requirements -0.029 0.217 [0.90] R-Squared 0.26
(0.0404) (0.1743) Rho AR(1) 0.25
US Federal Funds Rate 0.005 0.060 [0.60]
(0.0221) (0.0671)
Liquidity Above 75 percentile
Exchange Rate Depreciation -0.1468 0.0966 [0.90] Obs. 373
(0.3556) (0.5544) Groups 169
Reserve Requirements -0.425 0.217 [0.78] R-Squared 0.13
(0.2939) (0.1743) Rho AR(1) 0.20
US Federal Funds Rate -0.012 0.060 [0.08]
(0.1363) (0.0671)
This table presents selected coefficients from six sets of fixed-effects panel regressions. In all cases, the dependent variable is 
loan growth in constant local currency units. The reported coefficients are those associated with monetary conditions, measured 
by the Federal Funds rate, the yearly variation of the exchange rate (increase=depreciation) and an indicator of reserve 
requirements (which goes from 1 to 5 where a higher number indicates higher reserves). Controls, not reported here, include 
GDP growth and a set of bank characteristics (size, asset liquidity and capitalization). The table is divided in three panels. The 
upper displays the results of the regression based on the whole sample. The middle panel reports the results of two regressions, 
splitting the sample between banks with capitalization above (and below) the 75 percentile relative to other banks operating in 
the same country. The lower panel follows a similar structure, but the sample is split by liquidity levels. The estimation is based 
on GLS, allowing for panel-specific AR(1) processes.
Standard errors between parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 10%; *** significant at 1%. The p-values 
coresponding to the null of coefficient equality across domestic and foreign banks between [square] brackets.
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Exchange Rate Depreciation -0.1188 * 0.2317 *** [0.00] Obs. 2631
(0.0691) (0.0722) Groups 627
Reserve Requirements -0.075 -0.461 *** [0.05] R-Squared 0.26
(0.0922) (0.1759) Rho AR(1) 0.14
US Federal Funds Rate 0.039 ** -0.013 [0.00]
(0.0165) (0.0197)
Capitalization Below 75 percentile
Exchange Rate Depreciation -0.2040 ** 0.2345 *** [0.00] Obs. 2032
(0.0802) (0.0905) Groups 511
Reserve Requirements -0.032 -0.328 ** [0.12] R-Squared 0.26
(0.0915) (0.1658) Rho AR(1) 0.15
US Federal Funds Rate 0.054 *** -0.018 [0.00]
(0.0171) (0.0202)
Capitalization Above 75 percentile
Exchange Rate Depreciation 0.3491 * 0.0683 [0.62] Obs. 442
(0.1861) (0.0623) Groups 181
Reserve Requirements -0.253 -0.515 *** [0.81] R-Squared 0.38
(0.3863) (0.1440) Rho AR(1) 0.21
US Federal Funds Rate -0.052 -0.028 * [0.59]
(0.0555) (0.0162)
Liquidity Below 75 percentile
Exchange Rate Depreciation -0.3327 *** 0.2154 [0.00] Obs. 2105
(0.0647) (0.1917) Groups 527
Reserve Requirements -0.025 -0.496 [0.00] R-Squared 0.34
(0.0770) (0.9463) Rho AR(1) 0.28
US Federal Funds Rate 0.040 *** -0.019 [0.00]
(0.0134) (0.0627)
Liquidity Above 75 percentile
Exchange Rate Depreciation -0.0347 0.2154 [0.36] Obs. 358
(0.3986) (0.1917) Groups 161
Reserve Requirements -0.238 -0.496 [0.51] R-Squared 0.29
(0.6127) (0.9463) Rho AR(1) 0.25
US Federal Funds Rate -0.061 -0.019 [0.18]
(0.0899) (0.0627)
This table presents selected coefficients from six sets of fixed-effects panel regressions. In all cases, the dependent variable is 
loan growth in constant local currency units. The reported coefficients are those associated with monetary conditions, measured 
by the Federal Funds rate, the yearly variation of the exchange rate (increase=depreciation) and an indicator of reserve 
requirements (which goes from 1 to 5 where a higher number indicates higher reserves). Controls, not reported here, include 
GDP growth and a set of bank characteristics (size, asset liquidity and capitalization). The table is divided in three panels. The 
upper displays the results of the regression based on the whole sample. The middle panel reports the results of two regressions, 
splitting the sample between banks with capitalization above (and below) the 75 percentile relative to other banks operating in 
the same country. The lower panel follows a similar structure, but the sample is split by liquidity levels. The estimation is based 
on GLS, allowing for panel-specific AR(1) processes.
Standard errors between parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 10%; *** significant at 1%. The p-values 
coresponding to the null of coefficient equality across domestic and foreign banks between [square] brackets.
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Table 10. Latin America, Regressions Using a Crises Window 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Bank-level controls
Size 0.2270 0.2710 -0.3110 -0.0130 0.0120 0.0010
[0.039]*** [0.038]*** [0.190] [0.004]*** [0.005]** [0.007]
Foreign*Size 0.0220 0.0570 0.1010 0.0000 -0.0100 -0.0130
[0.053] [0.052] [0.154] [0.006] [0.006]* [0.009]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.6740 -0.0860 -1.6310 -0.0550 -0.0770 -0.0830
[0.155]*** [0.139] [0.778]** [0.019]*** [0.036]** [0.029]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.4110 0.1140 1.5120 0.1090 0.0400 0.1050
[0.223]* [0.217] [0.836]* [0.036]*** [0.042] [0.050]**
Capitalization (t-1) 1.2380 2.2150 -1.9040 -0.0030 0.0800 0.1170
[0.325]*** [0.320]*** [1.677] [0.035] [0.048]* [0.060]*
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.8360 0.7930 2.3640 0.0550 -0.0410 -0.0240
[0.527] [0.520] [1.791] [0.065] [0.056] [0.089]
Target variables
Dummy Crises -0.0980 -0.1380 -0.2770 0.0300 0.0370 0.0580
[0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.209] [0.005]*** [0.011]*** [0.008]***
Foreign*Dummy Crises 0.1340 0.0710 0.0700 -0.0040 -0.0290 -0.0270
[0.070]* [0.081] [0.259] [0.011] [0.014]** [0.015]*
Constant 0.0220 0.0260 1.1860 0.0710 0.1210 0.1930
[0.014] [0.012]** [0.055]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]***
Observations 3019 3055 3020 2898 2955 2906
R-squared 0.41 0.37 0.55 0.86 0.60 0.71
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This Table compares the response of selected bank-level variables to GDP growth and crises/non-crises period across 
domestic and foreign banks. The regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors. 
The sample covers the Latin American countries.
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Table 11. Asia, Regressions Using a Crises Window 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Bank-level controls
Size 0.1270 0.2060 0.0780 -0.0080 0.0030 -0.0050
[0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.118] [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.003]
Foreign*Size 0.1120 0.2010 0.4140 0.0080 -0.0020 0.0050
[0.051]** [0.052]*** [0.303] [0.005] [0.003] [0.007]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.7570 -0.0910 -1.7290 -0.0220 -0.0510 -0.0790
[0.145]*** [0.092] [0.609]*** [0.011]* [0.010]*** [0.013]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.2920 0.4940 -0.6090 0.0100 0.0230 0.0360
[0.233] [0.208]** [1.856] [0.059] [0.019] [0.073]
Capitalization (t-1) 0.8860 1.2560 0.3880 0.0270 0.0140 0.0430
[0.206]*** [0.211]*** [0.643] [0.031] [0.011] [0.030]
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.1720 0.2740 0.2290 0.0210 0.0220 0.0420
[0.402] [0.449] [0.831] [0.039] [0.021] [0.043]
Target variables
Dummy Crises -0.0920 -0.0440 0.0090 -0.0040 0.0230 0.0190
[0.019]*** [0.019]** [0.049] [0.001]** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Dummy Crises -0.0300 -0.1100 -0.3190 0.0020 -0.0050 -0.0030
[0.040] [0.039]*** [0.154]** [0.005] [0.003]* [0.006]
Constant 0.1250 0.1260 1.2440 0.0490 0.0680 0.1150
[0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.040]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
Observations 3343 3327 3271 2956 3050 2965
R-squared 0.43 0.37 0.71 0.92 0.94 0.90
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This Table compares the response of selected bank-level variables to GDP growth and crises/non-crises period across 
domestic and foreign banks. The regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors. 
The sample covers the Asian countries.
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Table 12. Latin America, Regressions Specifying Pre- and Post- Crises Years 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Bank-level controls
Size 0.2330 0.2790 -0.3100 -0.0130 0.0100 0.0000
[0.040]*** [0.039]*** [0.187]* [0.004]*** [0.005]** [0.007]
Foreign*Size 0.0190 0.0560 0.1010 0.0000 -0.0090 -0.0130
[0.054] [0.053] [0.152] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.6790 -0.0790 -1.6320 -0.0550 -0.0780 -0.0840
[0.154]*** [0.138] [0.781]** [0.019]*** [0.036]** [0.029]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.4030 0.0910 1.5070 0.1110 0.0410 0.1080
[0.223]* [0.217] [0.839]* [0.036]*** [0.042] [0.050]**
Capitalization (t-1) 1.2350 2.2250 -1.9140 -0.0010 0.0750 0.1150
[0.326]*** [0.322]*** [1.670] [0.035] [0.047] [0.059]*
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.8360 0.7750 2.3690 0.0530 -0.0350 -0.0220
[0.529] [0.523] [1.784] [0.066] [0.055] [0.089]
Target variables
Crises (T-1) 0.0690 0.0620 -0.1570 0.0240 -0.0060 0.0180
[0.066] [0.070] [0.110] [0.007]*** [0.006] [0.010]*
Foreign*Crises (T-1) 0.0850 0.1840 0.1480 -0.0080 -0.0100 -0.0180
[0.105] [0.108]* [0.133] [0.014] [0.011] [0.018]
Crises (T) -0.0730 -0.0730 -0.2820 0.0310 0.0150 0.0450
[0.069] [0.076] [0.138]** [0.007]*** [0.007]** [0.010]***
Foreign*Crises (T) 0.1120 0.0780 0.0990 -0.0220 -0.0050 -0.0270
[0.134] [0.150] [0.141] [0.015] [0.014] [0.019]
Crises (T+1) -0.1370 -0.2030 -0.3030 0.0290 0.0560 0.0720
[0.040]*** [0.039]*** [0.281] [0.007]*** [0.016]*** [0.011]***
Foreign*Crises (T+1) 0.1690 0.0680 0.0570 0.0070 -0.0480 -0.0320
[0.070]** [0.085] [0.371] [0.014] [0.019]** [0.021]
Constant 0.0190 0.0220 1.1850 0.0710 0.1220 0.1940
[0.014] [0.012]* [0.054]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]***
Observations 3019 3055 3020 2898 2955 2906
R-squared 0.41 0.38 0.55 0.86 0.60 0.71
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This Table compares the response of selected bank-level variables to GDP growth and crises/non-crises period across domestic and 
foreign banks. The regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors. The sample covers the Latin 
American countries.
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Table 13. Asia, Regressions Specifying Pre- and Post- Crises Years 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Bank-level controls
Size 0.1240 0.2030 0.0830 -0.0090 0.0030 -0.0050
[0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.118] [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.003]
Foreign*Size 0.1030 0.1940 0.4040 0.0080 -0.0040 0.0040
[0.050]** [0.052]*** [0.305] [0.005] [0.003] [0.007]
Liquidity (t-1) 0.8030 -0.0650 -1.7330 -0.0200 -0.0500 -0.0770
[0.146]*** [0.092] [0.612]*** [0.011]* [0.011]*** [0.013]***
Foreign*Liquidity (t-1) 0.3410 0.5500 -0.5260 0.0090 0.0210 0.0330
[0.231] [0.207]*** [1.838] [0.059] [0.019] [0.072]
Capitalization (t-1) 0.8020 1.2090 0.3610 0.0260 0.0080 0.0390
[0.204]*** [0.214]*** [0.648] [0.031] [0.012] [0.031]
Foreign*Capitalization (t-1) 0.1330 0.2240 0.2730 0.0190 0.0230 0.0380
[0.391] [0.446] [0.837] [0.039] [0.020] [0.044]
Target variables
Crises (T-1) 0.0380 0.0160 0.0470 0.0020 0.0010 0.0040
[0.011]*** [0.014] [0.034] [0.001]** [0.002] [0.001]***
Foreign*Crises (T-1) 0.0170 -0.0160 -0.1570 0.0000 0.0060 0.0040
[0.024] [0.029] [0.086]* [0.003] [0.002]** [0.004]
Crises (T) -0.0330 -0.0100 -0.0170 -0.0010 0.0180 0.0150
[0.013]** [0.015] [0.034] [0.001] [0.002]*** [0.001]***
Foreign*Crises (T) 0.0450 -0.0170 -0.1730 0.0010 -0.0030 0.0000
[0.032] [0.032] [0.103]* [0.004] [0.003] [0.005]
Crises (T+1) -0.1360 -0.0640 -0.0310 -0.0020 0.0110 0.0090
[0.016]*** [0.019]*** [0.032] [0.001] [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises (T+1) -0.0540 -0.1270 -0.1100 -0.0020 -0.0030 -0.0060
[0.030]* [0.031]*** [0.074] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004]
Constant 0.1140 0.1180 1.2390 0.0480 0.0700 0.1160
[0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.040]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
Observations 3343 3327 3271 2956 3050 2965
R-squared 0.45 0.38 0.71 0.92 0.94 0.90
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This Table compares the response of selected bank-level variables to GDP growth and crises/non-crises period across 
domestic and foreign banks. The regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors. The 
sample covers the Asian countries.    
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Table 14. Latin America, Alternative Crises Definitions 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Caprio-Kinglebiel
Crises C-K (T-1) 0.006 -0.075 -0.267 0.025 0.000 0.026
[0.047] [0.045]* [0.127]** [0.006]*** [0.006] [0.009]***
Foreign*Crises C-K (T-1) -0.142 0.005 0.032 -0.024 -0.008 -0.033
[0.082]* [0.079] [0.135] [0.010]** [0.010] [0.012]***
Crises C-K (T) -0.101 -0.171 -0.350 0.045 0.045 0.081
[0.046]** [0.047]*** [0.282] [0.007]*** [0.012]*** [0.011]***
Foreign*Crises C-K (T) 0.136 0.123 0.019 0.000 -0.057 -0.051
[0.075]* [0.087] [0.326] [0.011] [0.015]*** [0.017]***
Crises C-K (T+1) 0.066 -0.005 -0.316 0.009 -0.008 0.013
[0.039]* [0.041] [0.275] [0.005]* [0.014] [0.009]
Foreign*Crises C-K (T+1) 0.123 0.042 -0.108 0.023 -0.014 -0.003
[0.077] [0.087] [0.410] [0.012]* [0.016] [0.017]
Frankel-Rose
Crises F-R (T-1) -0.029 0.157 0.141 0.002 -0.012 -0.006
[0.042] [0.051]*** [0.195] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011]
Foreign*Crises F-R (T-1) 0.034 0.006 0.254 -0.006 -0.005 -0.012
[0.101] [0.107] [0.465] [0.010] [0.013] [0.015]
Crises F-R (T) -0.226 -0.026 -0.205 0.011 0.036 0.046
[0.055]*** [0.060] [0.140] [0.006]* [0.009]*** [0.011]***
Foreign*Crises F-R (T) 0.184 0.073 0.738 0.009 -0.007 0.003
[0.100]* [0.111] [0.561] [0.012] [0.015] [0.020]
Crises F-R (T+1) -0.150 -0.110 0.126 0.009 0.043 0.056
[0.043]*** [0.042]*** [0.292] [0.007] [0.011]*** [0.013]***
Foreign*Crises F-R (T+1) 0.123 0.091 -0.028 0.005 0.035 0.038
[0.079] [0.083] [0.436] [0.015] [0.020]* [0.022]*
Kaminsky-Reinhart
Crises K-R (T-1) 0.016 0.010 -0.149 0.024 0.004 0.027
[0.057] [0.061] [0.103] [0.006]*** [0.005] [0.008]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T-1) -0.033 0.091 0.046 -0.017 -0.009 -0.025
[0.089] [0.084] [0.121] [0.012] [0.007] [0.013]*
Crises K-R (T) -0.069 -0.069 -0.287 0.034 0.025 0.059
[0.069] [0.076] [0.141]** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.010]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T) 0.116 0.088 0.101 -0.023 -0.008 -0.031
[0.133] [0.149] [0.142] [0.016] [0.013] [0.017]*
Crises K-R (T+1) -0.147 -0.213 -0.302 0.029 0.059 0.074
[0.040]*** [0.039]*** [0.282] [0.007]*** [0.016]*** [0.011]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T+1) 0.162 0.059 0.049 0.007 -0.049 -0.032
[0.071]** [0.086] [0.376] [0.015] [0.020]** [0.021]
This table reports selected coefficients from a set of 18 panel regressions that compare the behavior of bank loans, deposits, and 
interest rates, across domestic and foreign banks, around periods of financial crises. The sample covers 11 Latin American countries 
during 1989-2001. Each column covers 3 separate regressions that share the same dependent variable, described in the first row, and 
the same set of (unreported) bank-level controls: size, liquidity, and capitalization. Bank-level controls were lagged one period to 
reduce potential endogeneity problems. The reported coefficients correspond to a set of dummy variables, generically labeled as "T-
1", "T", and "T+1". Those labeled with "T" equal one during banking crises and zero elsewhere. Correspondingly, "T-1" equal one a 
year before financial crises and zero elsewhere, and "T+1" equal one a year after banking crises, and zero elsewhere. To provide 
sensitivity analysis, three alternative definitions of banking crises were used: Caprio-Kinglebiel, Frankel-Rose, and Kaminsky-
Reinhart. These are reported in the upper-, middle-, and lower-panel, respectively.
In order to compare the behavior of domestic and foreign banks, each explanatory variable was interacted with a "foreign bank" 
dummy. All regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors, reportes between square brackets. *, 
**, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.    
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Table 15. Asia, Alternative Crises Definitions 





Deposits Bank Spread Deposit Rate Lending Rate
Caprio-Kinglebiel
Crises C-K (T-1) 0.008 -0.021 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.008
[0.017] [0.021] [0.062] [0.002]** [0.002]* [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises C-K (T-1) -0.017 -0.065 -0.208 -0.004 0.011 0.006
[0.037] [0.050] [0.187] [0.006] [0.004]** [0.008]
Crises C-K (T) -0.095 -0.086 -0.083 0.004 0.018 0.021
[0.018]*** [0.016]*** [0.061] [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises C-K (T) -0.015 -0.071 -0.217 -0.007 0.005 -0.001
[0.048] [0.044] [0.177] [0.006] [0.004] [0.008]
Crises C-K (T+1) -0.15 -0.055 0.017 -0.008 0.005 -0.003
[0.024]*** [0.020]*** [0.101] [0.004]** [0.001]*** [0.004]
Foreign*Crises C-K (T+1) -0.159 -0.102 -0.391 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009
[0.057]*** [0.059]* [0.169]** [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
Frankel-Rose
Crises F-R (T-1) 0.0230 -0.0260 0.0630 -0.0020 0.0050 0.0050
[0.023] [0.026] [0.096] [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002]**
Foreign*Crises F-R (T-1) 0.0040 -0.0270 -0.7470 -0.0050 0.0030 -0.0040
[0.043] [0.065] [0.210]*** [0.006] [0.003] [0.008]
Crises F-R (T) -0.1950 -0.1580 -0.0080 -0.0160 0.0310 0.0140
[0.025]*** [0.028]*** [0.081] [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Foreign*Crises F-R (T) -0.0460 -0.1180 -0.8810 0.0070 -0.0150 -0.0070
[0.048] [0.048]** [0.231]*** [0.005] [0.003]*** [0.006]
Crises F-R (T+1) -0.1840 -0.0990 -0.0950 -0.0130 0.0050 -0.0080
[0.038]*** [0.033]*** [0.060] [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]***
Foreign*Crises F-R (T+1) 0.0820 -0.0120 -0.7050 0.0180 -0.0030 0.0150
[0.054] [0.063] [0.454] [0.015] [0.004] [0.018]
Kaminsky-Reinhart
Crises K-R (T-1) 0.038 0.005 0.06 0.002 0.009 0.012
[0.020]* [0.024] [0.075] [0.001] [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T-1) 0.007 -0.033 -0.279 0.001 0.006 0.006
[0.041] [0.052] [0.189] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007]
Crises K-R (T) -0.122 -0.048 -0.049 -0.004 0.039 0.032
[0.027]*** [0.024]** [0.054] [0.002]* [0.004]*** [0.002]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T) 0.066 -0.057 -0.315 0.004 -0.012 -0.005
[0.055] [0.050] [0.190]* [0.007] [0.005]** [0.008]
Crises K-R (T+1) -0.225 -0.106 0.028 -0.011 0.02 0.01
[0.035]*** [0.032]*** [0.058] [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Foreign*Crises K-R (T+1) -0.115 -0.209 -0.339 0.003 -0.01 -0.008
[0.056]** [0.058]*** [0.155]** [0.005] [0.004]*** [0.006]
This table reports selected coefficients from a set of 18 panel regressions that compare the behavior of bank loans, deposits, and 
interest rates, across domestic and foreign banks, around periods of financial crises. The sample covers 9 Asian countries during 1989-
2001. Each column covers 3 separate regressions that share the same dependent variable, described in the first row, and the same set 
of (unreported) bank-level controls: size, liquidity, and capitalization. Bank-level controls were lagged one period to reduce potential 
endogeneity problems. The reported coefficients correspond to a set of dummy variables, generically labeled as "T-1", "T", and 
"T+1". Those labeled with "T" equal one during banking crises and zero elsewhere. Correspondingly, "T-1" equal one a year before 
financial crises and zero elsewhere, and "T+1" equal one a year after banking crises, and zero elsewhere. To provide sensitivity 
analysis, three alternative definitions of banking crises were used: Caprio-Kinglebiel, Frankel-Rose, and Kaminsky-Reinhart. These 
are reported in the upper-, middle-, and lower-panel, respectively.
In order to compare the behavior of domestic and foreign banks, each explanatory variable was interacted with a "foreign bank" 
dummy. All regressions were computed with bank-level fixed effects and robust standard errors, reportes between square brackets. *, 
**, ***, indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.    
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APPENDIX 1. SCALES FOR RESERVE REQUIREMENTS BY COUNTRY 
 
I. SCALE
IF RESERVE REQUIREMENT IS:
BETWEEN 1% AND 15% : 1-2
BETWEEN 16% AND 30% : 2-3
BETWEEN 31% AND 70% : 3-4
BETWEEN 71% AND 100% : 4-5
SUB- CATEGORIES:
BETWEEN 1% AND 15%  BETWEEN 16% AND 30%  BETWEEN 31% AND 70%  BETWEEN 71% AND 100% 
1.00% 1.00 16.00% 2.00 31% 3.00 71% 4.00
3.00% 1.20 19.50% 2.25 40% 3.25 80% 4.30
4.50% 1.30 23.00% 2.50 50% 3.50 85% 4.50
6.00% 1.40 25.00% 2.60 60% 3.75 90% 4.60
7.50% 1.50 26.50% 2.75 70% 3.99 100% 4.99
9.00% 1.60 29.00% 2.95




EXAMPLES THAT CAN BE EXTENDED FOR OTHER CASES:
9.00% 1.60 10.50% 1.70
9.25% 1.62 10.75% 1.72
9.50% 1.64 11.00% 1.74
9.75% 1.65 11.25% 1.75
10.00% 1.67 11.50% 1.77
10.25% 1.69 11.75% 1.79
10.50% 1.70 12.00% 1.80
II. HOW DO WE ASSIGN THE FINAL SCALE?
1)
2)
3) In cases where reserve requirements on demand deposits in domestic currency were not applicable, or did not show variation, a parallel policy 
instrument (such as liquidity requirements, reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits, etc.) was also used (second criterium). The list of 
policy instruments used for each country is presented in Appendix 2.
During years with one or more changes in reserve requirements, the index reflects the weighted average of its intra-year values, using the relative 
time of the policy regimes as weights.
For each country, we specify the policy instrument used to construct the reserve requirement index. Most cases use the reserve requirement on 
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APPENDIX 2. CRITERIA FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE RESERVE REQUIREMENTS INDEX 
ARGENTINA
First Criterium:
Reserve requirements (minimum cash requirement) until 1994
Minimum liquidity requirements since 1995
Second Criterium:
Reserve requirements for deposits in foreign currency.
BOLIVIA
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
BRAZIL
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
Reserve requirements for saving and time deposits in domestic currency, and
daily balance to be held in banking reserves.
CHILE
First Criterium:
Reserve requirements on demand deposits (foreign currency).
Second Criterium:
Reserve requirement on external credits.
COLOMBIA
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
Reserve requirements for saving and time deposits in domestic currency.
INDIA
First Criterium:
Cash reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
Statutory liquidity ratio on demand and time liabilities.
INDONESIA
First Criterium:
Statutory reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
Statutory reserve requirement on foreign currency deposits.
KOREA
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:









Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency) until 1988.
Liquidity coeffcient from 1989 to 1990.
Liquidity coeffcient  for deposits in foreign currency  1991 (August) to 1994.
PARAGUAY
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).
PERU
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
Reserve requirements for deposits in foreign currency.
PHILIPPINES
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency). The reserve requirement
against peso demand is the sum of the statutory and the liquidity reserve ratios.
SINGAPORE
First Criterium:
Minimum cash balance on demand deposits (domestic currency).
TAIWAN
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement ratio on demand deposits (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
The required reserve ratio for passbook saving deposits, time saving deposits and time deposits.
THAILAND
First Criterium:
Liquidity  requirement ratio on demand deposits (domestic currency).
Second Criterium:
Minimum reserve requirement on non-resident bath deposits.
URUGUAY
First Criterium:
The remunerated reserve requirement on sight deposits in local currency.
VENEZUELA
First Criterium:
Reserve requirement on demand deposits (domestic currency).  
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APPENDIX 3. RESERVE REQUIREMENTS INDEX 
ARGENTINA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1986 4.580 Reserve requirements were kept at 89,5%  on demand deposits.  
1989 4.500 The average reserve requirement of the system was 71% in June. There was a reduction of reserve requirements for
deposits in foreign currency.
1990 4.575 As from July, reserve requirements were reduced 3% in cases of technical reserves for demand deposits and
by 1.5% additional for fixed time deposits. By September, the contractionary monetary policy was further deepened, so
the backing figures returned to their previous high levels.
1991 4.555 In December, the Central Bank  reduced minimum cash requirements to  79% on demand deposits.
1992 4.120 There  were not substancial  variations in minimum cash requirements. Requirements on deposits
whose holders belonged to the non-financial public sector were reduced by 6%. As of October 1 
the Central Bank reduced by 2% the minimun cash requirement on peso deposits in current accounts
and other sight and fixed term operations, at 71% .
1993 3.354 The Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements for current accounts and sight operations in both
currencies, implying a substantial reduction in reserve requirements for current accounts in pesos from 71% to 40% .
In August, the Central Bank set a 3% increase, to 43%, in cash requirements on current account and saving deposits.
1994 3.300 The Central Bank reduced temporarily required minimums covering dollars deposits from 43% for sight deposits dated 
12-15-95, to 35% until 1-15-95. For fixed-term deposits the minimum cash requirement dropped from 3% to 1%  as of
12-16-94 to be reestablished at 3% as of 2-1-95.
1995 3.082 As of November 1995, reserve requirements have been replaced by minimum liquidity requirements (Requisitos Minimos
de Liquidez), which  may include earning assets. All deposits were subject to a uniform 15% liquidity requirement.
1996 2.100 The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%.
1997 2.200 The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 2% .
1998 2.300 The Central Bank increased the minimum liquidity requirement by 1% .
2001 2.188 In April, the Central Bank reduced the minimum liquidity requirement by 2%.
In June, the Central Bank established a new liquidity regime based on a minimum cash requirement over sight
operations, whereas the rules realted to minimum liquidity requirements only involved fixed term deposits.
Source:  Annual Report of the Argentine Economy- Economic Trends. Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones.
BOLIVIA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 3.500 Central Bank reduced reserve requirements on demand deposits, saving deposits and time deposits, 
all in domestic currency. From 60% to 50% in the case of demand deposits.
1986 3.250 Central Bank reduced reserve requirements on demand deposits, saving deposits and time deposits, 
all in domestic currency. From 50% to 40% in the case of demand deposits.
1987 2.765 In July. Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements to 20% for different types of deposits and currencies 
1994 1.975 In July, the Central Bank eliminated the marginal reserve requirement for deposits in domestic currency.
The marginal reserve requirement was 10% for demand and saving deposits, and 6% for time deposits
(less than 365 days).
1998 1.757 In May, Central Bank homogenized the reserve requirements to 12% for different types of deposits and currencies.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Bolivia.
BRAZIL
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1984 3.300 The Central Bank increased reserve requirements from 10% to 22% for time deposits. The average reserve requirement on dem
deposits was 43%.
1985 3.170 The rate of reserve requirements on demand deposits in the commercial banks dropped from an average  of 43% to 36%.
1988 3.180 Reserve requirements are rationalized, requirements differing according to bank size. As of December, the average implicit
reserve requirement represented 37% of deposits. 
1993 3.458 The percentage of the reserve requirement moved from 40% to 50% but had little impact on the banking  system's capacity to
grant credit, since demand deposits represented less than 1% of GDP.
1994 4.337 Under the Real Plan, the Central Bank raised the reserve requirement on demand deposits to 100% in June, which was reduced
to 90% in December. The reserve requeriment on time deposits was raised from 20% to 30% in August and then reduced  to
27%  in December. For saving deposits, the reserve requirement was raised from 20% to 30% in August.
1995 4.500 The reserve requirement on demand deposits was reduced from 90% to 83% in July, for time deposits the rate was reduced 
to 20% in August, and for saving deposits the rate was reduced to 15%.
1996 4.200 The criteria for reserve requirements and obligatory reserves on demand deposits were altered and a schedule was defined
according to which the rate would gradually decline from 83% to 78% as of December.
1997 4.150 In January, the reserve requirement on demand deposits was reduced from 78% to 75% .
1999 4.075 In October, the reserve requirement on demand deposits was reduced from 75% to 65% .
2000 3.538 The reserve requirement on demand deposits was reduced twice during the year to 55% in March and to 45% in June.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of  Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil).    
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CHILE
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1991 2.300 In June, the Central Bank stablished a 20% reserve requirement on external credits for less than 1 year.
1992 2.588 In January, the Central Bank stablished a 20% reserve requirement on demand and term deposits in
foreign currency.
In March, the reserve requirement was increased to 30% for financial entities not in the Chapter XIV of
CNCI (Compendium of Regulations Governing Foreign Exchange).
In August, the reserve requirement for external credits was increased to 30%.
1996 2.990 In December, credit and financial investment operations between US$ 10,000 and US$ 200,000 done under
the Chapter XIV of CNCI were released of the 30% reserve requirement.
1998 2.300 In April, the Central Bank reduced the reserve requirements on external credits from 30% to 10%.
In September, the reserve requirement on external credits was eliminated (unremunerated reserve requirement
for short-term capital inflows).
In December, there was a reduction of reserve requirements to  deposits in foreign currency. 
From 30% to 19% for  demand deposits, and from 30 to 13.6% for term deposits.
10% of the reserve requirement in foreign currency was remunerated.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of  Chile.
COLOMBIA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1984 3.300 The monetary authority reduced the reserve requirement (RR) from 45%  to 43% on demand
deposits. Also, it was reduced the RR of term deposits of and above six months from 10% to 6%.
1987 3.350 The RR of demand deposits was raised to 44%.
1988 3.250 The RR of demand deposits was reduced from 44% to 40%, and also it was reduced the RR
of demand deposits with entities of the public sector from 65% to 61%.
1989 3.230 The RR of demand deposits was reduced from 40% to 39%, and also it was reduced the RR
of demand deposits with entities of the public sector from 61% to 53%.
1990 3.100 The RR of demand deposits was reduced from 39% to 33.5%, and also it was reduced the RR
of demand deposits with entities of the public sector from 56% to 52.5%.
1991 3.280 In January, marginal reserve requirements of 100% were imposed on all new deposits. These 
reserves were held as interest-bearing central bank bonds. In September, the marginal reserve 
requirement was replaced by an increase in reserve requirement on most deposits.
RR of demand deposits was raised from 33.5% to 41% , and from 53.5% to 70% (public sector).
1992 3.260 The RR for saving deposits was reduced from 31% to 10%, and from 23% to 10% in the case
of term deposits.
1995 3.250 RR of demand deposits was reduced from 41% to 40% , and from 70% to 60% (public sector).
A marginal reserve requirement (MRR) of 21% was stablished for demand deposits, and 10%
for saving deposits and term deposits.
1996 2.350 The RR on deposits was homogenized to 21%. The RR on term deposits was reduced to 5%
and the MRR was reduced to 7%.
1998 2.292 In November, the monetary authority determined the following changes:
The RR on demand deposits was reduced to 16% and the MRR was reduced to 16%
1999 1.870 The RR on demand deposits was reduced to 13% and the MRR was reduced to 13%
2000-2001 1.870 No changes.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Colombia (Banco de la Republica).
MEXICO
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1987 3.550 The Bank of Mexico (BOM) reduced the marginal reserve requirement (MRR) from 77.2% to 51%.
The distribution was: 10% in cash, 35% in credits to the Federal Government, and 6% to development
banks.
1988 3.500 The BOM determined liquidity coefficients. 30% of liabilities (aceptaciones bancarias) had to be invested 
in remunerated demand deposits in the BOM and other securities (CETES, BONDES).
The distribution of MRR required investment was: 10% in cash, 31% in credits to the Federal Government,
and 10% to developmengt banks.
1989 2.990 Liquidity coefficient applied also to liabilities coming from traditional bank instruments.
Promisory notes denominated in US dollars required a liquidity coefficient of 30%.
1991 2.903 In August, the BOM eliminated the existing liquidity coefficient on bank liabilities in domestic currency.
In June, the BOM established a 50% compulsory liquidity coefficient on foreign currency liabilities to be
constitued with liquid foreign assets.
In August, the BOM determined an ascendent scale of the liquidity coefficient from 0% to 50% depending
on the maturity of deposits.
1992 2.143 In April, the liquidity coefficient, which went from 0% up to 50% according to the maturity of the deposits,
was replaced by a 15% requirement.
1995 1.415 In March, the BOM adopted a zero average legal reserve requirement.
1996-2000 1.300 No changes.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Mexico (Banco de Mexico).    
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PARAGUAY
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1991 3.330 Reserve Requirement (RR) on demand deposits in local currency was at 42%.
1992 2.990 The Central Bank reduced the  RR for domestic currency deposits to 30%.
In June, the Central Bank started to remunerate legal RR on local currency deposits.
1993 2.600 The CB reduced the RR on local currency deposits from 30% to 25%.
RR on foreign currency deposits was 30%.
1994 2.500 In September, the CB reduced the RR on local currency deposits from 25% to 18%.
In October, the CB started to remunerate legal RR on local currency deposits in excess of 10%.
1995-2000 2.100 No changes.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Paraguay.
PERU
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 3.850 As of December, the reserve requirement was 65%.
In August, The marginal reserve requirement (MRR) was raised from 50% to 75% for liabilities in
domestic currency.
1986 3.760 As of December, the reserve requirement was 61%.
The Central Bank reduced the MRR twice. As of  May the MRR was 70% for liabilities in
domestic currency, and as October, the MRR was 64%.
1987 3.580 As of December, the reserve requirement was 53.1%.
In March, the Central bank reduced the MRR from 64% to 50% for liabilities in domestic currency.
The reduction only applied to bank branches located outside the Lima to support credit decentralization.
1990 3.350 As of December, the reserve requirement was 45%
In June, the Central Bank homogenized and raised the MRR to 80%, but in August it came back
to the initial scheme of 64% and 50%. In September, the Central Bank homogenized and reduced
the MRR to 40% and then it was  reduced to 30% at the end of the year.
1991 2.600 The reserve requirement was reduced from 45% to 25.4% at the end of the year.
 In October, the MRR was reduced to 15%  and then reduced to 5% at the end of the year.
The Central Bank raised the MRR from 30% to 50% for liabilities in foreign currency.
1992 1.625 As of December, the reserve requirement was at the level of 9.3%. There was a unification
of the legal and exigible reserve requirement. In March, the MRR was reduced to 0% for domestic
currency deposits.
1993 1.620 The Central Bank established a reserve requirement of 9% for domestic currency, and 
reduced the MRR from 50% to 45% for foreign currency.
1997 1.470 The Central Bank reduced the reserve requirement to 7%
1998 1.470 The Central Bank reduced the average reserve requirement by 4.5% between October and
December for liabilities in foreign currency.
In December, the MRR in foreign currency was reduced from 35% to 20%.
2000 1.400 In September, the reserve requirement was reduced from 7% to 6%, an a 1% minimum
reserve requirement in the form of demand deposits kept at the Central Bank was introduced.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Reserve Bank of  Peru.
URUGUAY
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1991 1.870 The remunerated reserve requirement (RR) on sight deposits in local currency was 13%.
1992 1.670 The RR on sight deposits in local currency was reduced to 10%.
1993-2000 1.670 No changes.
Source: IMF Staff Country Reports.
VENEZUELA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1990 1.927 In January, the central bank (CB) unified the RR on demand, time and saving deposits to 12%.
In May, the CB raised the RR to 15%.
1991 2.244 In May, the CB established a special RR of 80% on public sector deposits in commercial banks.
In August, the CB raised the RR on demand, savings and time deposits to 25% gradually.
1992 2.397 In September, the CB established that the RR on liabilities held until August 30 was 25%, and for liabilities
after this date the RR was 15%.
Also, the CB reduced the RR on public sector deposits in commercial banks from 80% to 25% gradually.
In December, it was adjusted to 15%.
1993 1.990 In November, the CB unified the RR scheme. For commercial banks the RR was 15%.
1998 2.100 The RR was raised to 17%.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of  Venezuela.    
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INDIA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1987 1.644 In February, the cash reserve requirement (CRR) was raised from 9% to 9.5%.
In May, the CRR on foreign currency non-resident (FCNR) deposit liabilities was raised from 3% to 9.5%.
In October, the CRR was raised from 9.5% to 10% of net demand and time liabilities.
1988 1.705 In July, the CRR was raised from 10% to 11% of net demand and time liabilities.
In July, the CRR on FCNR was raised from 9.5% to 10% .
1989 1.866 In July, the CRR was homogenized at 15% for all net demand and time liabilities.
1990 1.992 In September, statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) was raised from 38% to 38.5% of net demand and time liabilities.
1992 1.980 In April, SLR was reduced from 38.5% to 37.75% of net demand and time liabilities.
In April, banks were exempted from the mantainance of the 10% incremental CRR on net
demand and time liabilities.
1993 1.973 In September, CRR was reduced from 15% to 14%.
1994 1.990 CRR was raised from 14% to 15%  in three phases.
In October, a CRR of 7.5%  on FCNR deposit liabilities was stablished.
1995 1.982 In January,  CRR of deposit liabilities under Foreign Currency (NR) was raised to 15%.
In November and December, the CRR was reduced from 15% to 14%.
1996 1.848 In May, the CRR was reduced from 14% to 13%.
In July, the CRR was reduced from 13% to 12%.
In November, the CRR was reduced from 12% to 11%.
1997 1.665 In January, the CRR was reduced from 11% to 10%.
In October, the CRR was reduced from 10% to 9.75%.
1998 1.683 In March, the CRR was raised from 9.75% to 10.25%.
1999 1.675 In November, the CRR was reduced from 10.25% to 9%.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of  India.
INDONESIA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1988 1.100 Reserve requirements were reduced from 15% to 2%.
1995 1.100 In December, the Bank of Indonesia (BOI) amended the regulation on the reserve requirement to statutory 
reserve requirement. With this new regulation, the reserve components changed from demand deposits
with BOI and cash originally, to only demand deposit with BOI.
1996 1.192 In February, the new regulation required commercial banks to maintain 3% of their funds in the form of 
demand deposit with the BOI.
1997 1.192 The statutory reserve requirement for foreign currencies deposits was reduced from 5% to 3%.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Bank of Indonesia.
KOREA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 1.300 the reserve requirement (RR) for demand, time and saving deposits was 4,5%  in domestic currency and 1% in foreign
currency ( In July, the marginal reserve ratio for resident account in foreign currency was introduced at 20%).
1987 1.328 In November, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was raised to 7.0%  in domestic currency.
In February, the marginal reserve ratio for resident account in foreign currency was reduced to 4.5% .
1988 1.486 In December, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was raised to 10.0%  in domestic currency.
1989 1.680 In May, a 30% marginal reserve requirement (MRR) was introduced for deposits in domestic currency.
1990 1.762 In February, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was raised to 11.5%  in domestic  currency.
In March, the marginal reserve ratio for resident account in foreign currency was raised to 11.5% .
1996 1.621 In April, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was reduced to 9% in domestic currency
In April, the marginal reserve ratio  for resident account in foreign currency was reduced to 9% .
In November, RR for demand, time and saving deposits was reduced to 7%  in domestic currency.
In November, the marginal reserve ratio for resident accounts in foreign currency was reduced to 7% .
1997 1.351 In February, RR for demand deposits was reduced to 5%  in domestic currency. The RR for time and saving
deposits in domestic currency  was reduced to 2 %.
The Bank of Korea imposed a 2% RR on negotiable certificates of deposits.
2000 1.340 In April, the MRR  for resident account in foreign currency (demand deposits)  was reduced to 5%. The MRR
for resident account in foreign currency (time and saving deposits)  was reduced to 2% .
Source:  Annual Reports of the Bank of Korea.     
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MALAYSIA
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 1.288 In April,  the statutory reserve requeriment (SRR) of commercial banks (CB) was reduced from
5% to 4% of total eligible liabilities. For merchant banks (MB), the ratio was raised from 1.5%
to 2.5%. The SRR for finance companies (FC) remained unchanged at 2.5%.
1986 1.263 In February, the SRR of FC and MB as increased from 2.5% to 3%.
In October, the SRR  for CB was reduced from 4% to 3.5%.
In February, the liquidity requeriment (LR) of CB was reduced from 20% to 18.5 %. The LR for
MB and FC remained unchanged at 10%.
In October, the LR  for CB was reduced from 18.5% to 17%.
1987 1.238 The Central Bank reduced the liquidity ratio of CB from 10% to 8%, with the LR remaining
unchanged at 17% for MB and FC.
1988 1.233 The Central Bank reduced the liquidity ratio of CB from 8% to 5%, and abolished the liquidity
ratio for FC.
1989 1.298 In May, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to a uniform 4.5%.
In October, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 5.5%.
1990 1.440 In January, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 6.5%.
1991 1.465 In August, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 7.5%.
1992 1.547 In May, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 8.5%.
1994 1.715 In January, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 9.5%.
In May, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 10.5%.
In July, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 11.5%.
1996 1.873 In February,  the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 12.5%.
In June, the Central Bank raised the SRR of CB, MB and FC to 13.5%.
1998 1.521 In February, the Central Bank reduced the SRR of CB, MB and FC from 13.5% to 10%.
In July, the Central Bank reduced the SRR of CB, MB and FC from 10% to 8%.
In September,  the Central Bank reduced the SRR of CB, MB and FC from 8% to 4%.
1999-2000 1.250 No changes.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Malaysia.
PHILIPPINES
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1985 2.540 In September, the reserve requirement (RR) against short-term deposit liabilities of
commerical banks (CB) and thrift banks (TB) was reduced from 24% to 23%.
1986 2.438 The RR on long-term deposit instruments of banks was reduced by a total of 2
percentage points from 23% to 21% in May and August.
1987 2.350 No changes.
1988 2.350 No changes.
1989 2.333 In September, the RR on deposits and deposit substitutes was homogenized to 20%.
1990 2.600 A series of upward adjustments in the RR on bank deposits were made during the
year with a cummulative increase of 5 percentage points from 20% in 1989 to 25% at the
end of 1990 as a contractionary measure.
1991 2.600 No changes.
1992 2.600 No changes.
1993 2.300 A series of downward adjustments in the RR on bank deposits were made during the
year with a cummulative reduction of 5 percentage points from 25% in 1992 to 22% at the
end of 1993.
1994 2.100 The RR was reduced to 19%.
1995 2.027 In May, the RR was reduced to 17%.
1997 2.100 At the end of the year, the RR was 17%. During the year there were seven changes in the
liquidity reserve component of the RR.
1998 2.054 In May, the RR was reduced to 15%. In October, the RR was increased to 17%.
1999 1.950 The RR was reduced during the year by a total of 5 percentage points from 17% in January to reach 12% by July.
2000 1.850 In October, the RR was increased to 16%.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Philippines.    
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SINGAPORE
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1987 1.400 In May, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) reduced the minimum liquid asset ratio from
20% to 18%.
1998 1.300 In July, the MAS reduced the minimum cash balance (MCB) from 6% to 3%. The MCB had been
mantained at 6% since 1975.
The minimum liquid assets (MLA) requirement of finance companies was raised from 10% to 13%.
1999-2000 1.200 No changes.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Monetary Authority of Singapore.
TAIWAN
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1978 2.990 The required reserve ratio (RRR) for checking accounts (CA) was 30%
1979 2.730 In May, the RRR for CA was reduced to 25%. 
1982 2.542 In June, the RRR for CA was reduced to 23%.
1988 2.508 In December, the RRR for CA was raised to 25%. 
1989 2.863 In April, the RRR for CA was raised to 29%. 
1990 2.929 In August, the RRR for CA was reduced to 28.5%. 
1991 2.867 In September, the RRR for CA was reduced to 27.75%.
1993 2.773 In September, the RRR for CA was reduced to 26.25%. 
1995 2.692 In November, the RRR for CA was reduced to 23.75%. 
1996 2.508 In August, the RRR for CA was reduced to 22%. 
1997 2.408 In October, the RRR for CA was reduced to 19.75%. 
1998 2.247 In September, the RRR for CA was reduced to 18.75%.
1999 2.006 In February, the RRR for CA was reduced to 15%. 
2000 1.975 In October, the RRR for CA was reduced to 13.5%. 
2001 1.855 In October, the RRR for CA was reduced to 10.75%. 
Source:  Annual Reports of the Central Bank of the Republic of China.
THAILAND
Year Code Reserve Requirements
1990 1.470 To stabilize the money markets and reduce fluctuations of short-term interest rates, the BOT
modified the computacional procedure of commercial bank's reserve requirements.
1995 1.480 In August, non-resident bath deposits with maturity of less than one year are subject to a 7%
minimum reserve requirement in the form of deposits (with no interest) with the BOT.
While reserve requirements on domestic deposits were also 7%, they could be held in the form 
of interest-bearing public bonds. 
1997 1.447 In September, the BOT reduced the liquidity requirement ratio on total deposits from 7 % to 6%.
For finance companies the liquidity requirement on total domestic and foreign borrowing was
 reduced from 7% to 6%. This was also applied to non-resident deposits, or foreign borrowing
with maturity of less than one year.
1999 1.440 The BOT announced new rules on liquidity reserve requirement composition and procedure,
but not changes in rates.
2000 1.440 No changes.
Source:  Annual Reports of the Bank of Thailand.    
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APPENDIX 4. ALGORITHM TO TRACK THE EVOLUTION OF BANK OWNERSHIP 
This Appendix describes the algorithm used to reconstruct the evolution of bank ownership. 
Ideally, the objective is to identify foreign institutions involved in retail banking and with 
access to upstream financing from their mother banks.
13 This is the case of branches of 
foreign banks, which can obtain resources from their mother institutions as needed. This may 
also be the case of subsidiaries of foreign banks, although the availability of upstream 
resources in this case is not guaranteed. In this paper a bank is considered "foreign" if it is a 
branch of a bank incorporated in a foreign country, or if it has shareholders settled in a 
foreign country, holding together at least 51 percent of the bank capital. 
The above operational definition was applied in four steps. First, the Bankscope search 
engine was used to identify subsidiaries of banks from OECD countries. Those with more 
than 51 percent of ownership in the hands of foreign banks were selected. This search 
identified 304 banks at least partially owned by banks from OECD countries. Of those, 189 
had more than 51 percent in the hands of banks headquartered in OECD countries. Second, to 
verify the above list, the search engine of Bankscope was used to identify the shareholders of 
the sampled banks. Specifically, banks with shareholders settled in OECD countries, holding 
together at least 51 percent of the bank capital were filtered. In cases with no available 
information on percentage ownership, banks with one or more shareholders from OECD 
countries, and with local shareholders holding together less than 50 percent of the bank's 
                                                 
13 In practice, both the nature of the services provided by foreign banks, and their access to 
upstream resources, depend on the institutional modality of entry. The most commonly used 
are representative offices, branches, subsidiaries, and joint ventures.   
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capital, were also selected. These filtering criteria produced 313 cases. Of those, 171 were 
common to the 189 mentioned above, and taken as foreign banks without further check. The 
remaining 18 were checked individually by looking at their web pages. All of them were 
included in the final list of foreign banks. 
Third, as the information on ownership is not available for all the banks included in the 
Bankscope database, a list of banks with unknown dependence was produced. The search 
matched 801 banks. This information was crossed out with a list of transnational banks 
headquartered in OECD countries or the Cayman Islands, gathered from the web site 
www.transnationale.org. In addition, the list of banks in the sample was intersected with the 
lists of foreign banks available from the Central Banks' web pages of Hong Kong, Brazil, 
Singapore, and Thailand. On a case-by-case basis, 168 additional branches of foreign banks 
were also identified. 
The list produced by the above criteria provides information on ownership as of end-2000 (in 
some cases end-2001). In the fourth step, to obtain chronological information on changes in 
ownership throughout the period, the sample of banks was intersected with a comprehensive 
list of mergers and acquisitions targeting financial institutions in the sampled countries taken 
from the SDC Platinum database. Specifically, the list includes all transactions announced 
between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2000, targeting institutions classified under 
industrial (SIC) codes 6000, 6081, 6029, 6021, and 6712 (to be on the safe side, these codes 
include a broad category of target financial institutions). The search produced 1,227 
transactions involving 804 target institutions. Of those, 404 were matched with the sample of 
banks. In order to track acquisitions by financial institutions exclusively, the list ignored   
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operations were the acquirers and their nationalities were unknown. Using the description of 
each operation, nine categories were created, indicating the nationality of the buyer (foreign 
OECD, foreign non-OECD, government, domestic resident), and the resulting ownership 
position after the transaction (public, domestic, foreign OECD, and foreign non-OECD).
14 
With the help of this code, it was possible to replicate the evolution of bank ownership 




                                                 
14 In cases where the acquirer is a public company (there are several cases involving 
government-owned companies based in China), we classify the acquirer as government. 